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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Federal Practice and Procedure
CIVIL PROCEDURE - DIVERSITY JURISDICTION - FOR PURPOSES OF
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION, CITIZENSHIP OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IS THAT
OF LIMITED AS WELL AS GENERAL PARTNERS.
Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings & Loan Assoc. (1977).
Plaintiff Carlsberg Resources Corporation (Carlsberg), the sole general
partner of Carlsberg Mobile Home Properties, Ltd.-72 (Carlsberg, Ltd.), a
limited partnership, brought an action on behalf of the partnership against
Cambria Savings and Loan Association (Cambria) and certain land
developers for damages allegedly resulting from defendants' improprieties in
connection with a land development scheme.1 Since Carlsberg was a
California corporation and defendants were citizens of Pennsylvania,
plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania alleging diversity jurisdiction. 2 Pursuant to court
order, plaintiff produced documents which revealed that some of the limited
partners of Carlsberg, Ltd. were citizens of Pennsylvania. 3 Because of the
identity of citizenship between defendants and plaintiff's limited partners
who were Pennsylvania citizens, the trial judge dismissed the complaint for
want of complete diversity.' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit5 affirmed, holding that an identity of citizenship between a
number of limited partners and opposing litigants precluded the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings &
Loan Assoc., 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
In 1889, the Supreme Court established the general rule for determining
citizenship of unincorporated associations for diversity purposes in
Chapman v. Barney.6 In Chapman, a joint stock company organized under
1. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings & Loan Assoc., 413 F. Supp.
880, 881, 885 (W.D. Pa. 1976). The partnership allegedly incurred damages when a
trailer park which it had purchased from defendant developers subject to a mortgage
in favor of defendant Cambria was sold at a foreclosure sale. Id. at 884-85. Carlsberg
alleged negligence on Cambria's part in disbursing most of the construction loan
proceeds, which were secured by the mortgage, before construction of the park was
completed. Id. The complaint also alleged fraud by the developers in conspiring to
procure those funds ahead of schedule by knowingly submitting inaccurate
certifications as to the amount of work completed. Id.
2. Id. at 881. Carlsberg was incorporated in California and had its principal
place of business there. Id. The applicable jurisdiction statute provides for jurisdiction
of civil actions between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1970).
3. 413 F. Supp. at 881-82. The court requested that counsel for plaintiff provide a
list of the limited partners together with their addresses. Id. at 881. The list revealed
that out of more than 1,500 limited partners, approximately 38 were Pennsylvania
citizens. Id. at 882.
4. Id. at 881. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs negligence action was
insufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 886.
5. The case was heard by Judges Biggs, Adams and Hunter. Judge Adams wrote
the majority opinion to which Judge Hunter dissented.
6. 129 U.S. 677 (1889). In an opinion largely devoid of analysis or explanation,
the Court established a precedent with far-reaching results. See note 9 and
accompanying text infra.
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the laws of New York brought suit against an Illinois citizen in federal
district court, alleging diversity jurisdiction.7 The suit was dismissed for
lack of diversity because plaintiff was a joint stock company, not a
corporation. 8 The Chapman Court thereby established an important
distinction between corporations and unincorporated associations - that for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction only the former have entity status, thus
holding citizenship as entities independent of their members.9
While Chapman was never overruled, the Supreme Court recognized a
major deviation from this mechanical formula in Puerto Rico v. Russell &
Co.10 In Russell, petitioner sued Russell & Co., a company organized under
the laws of Puerto Rico as a sociedad en comandita, the civil law counterpart
of a limited partnership," in an insular court. 12 Since all of its shareholders
were nonresidents of Puerto Rico, Russell & Co. removed the action to the
7. 129 U.S. at 678. A joint stock company is generally an unincorporated
business enterprise with ownership interests represented by shares of stock. H. HENN,
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 50 (2d ed. 1970). A joint stock company is no longer a
prevalent form of association. A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON
PARTNERSHIPS, § 34 (1968). They are generally subject to statutory regulation, with
creation by articles of association generally required. HENN, supra, at §§ 50-51.
Profits and losses are shared in proportion to the interests of the respective
shareholders, and each shareholder is subject to unlimited liability. Id. §§ 53-54.
However, a shareholder's personal assets can be reached only by a separate action if
the company's assets are insufficient to satisfy a judgment. Id. § 54. The joint stock
company is generally managed by a board of directors and officers, who act as agents
of the shareholders. Id. § 53. Share interests are freely transferrable, and perpetual
existence is possible. Id. §§ 55-56.
8. 129 U.S. at 682. Although the company had been organized under New York
law, the Court noted that it was not a corporation, but rather a "mere partnership."
Id. The Court also observed that although the company might have been doing
business in New York, all of its members were not necessarily New York citizens. Id.
The Chapman Court was unwilling to extend the rationale of its decision in
Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853), in which it held that
corporations could sue or be sued in their state of incorporation. 57 U.S. at 328-29. For
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the Marshall Court established corporate citizen-
ship by a conclusive presumption that all stockholders were citizens of the state of
incorporation. Id. The dissent in Marshall questioned the constitutionality of this
presumption. Id. at 341-43 (Daniel, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the citizenship
of corporations, see generally Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens and
Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 202 (1946); McGovney, A Supreme Court
Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
(pts. 1-3), 56 HARV. L. REV. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943).
9. 129 U.S. at 682. With respect to diversity jurisdiction Chapman was followed
for several decades. See, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904) (state
university board of trustees, possessing corporate characteristics); Great Southern
Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (limited partnership); Levering &
Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1932), aff'd, 289 U.S. 103 (1933)
(unincorporated labor union); Taylor v. Weir, 171 F. 636 (3d Cir. 1909) (joint stock
association); Rountree v. Adams Express Co., 165 F. 152 (8th Cir. 1908) (joint stock
company); Fred Macey Co. v. Macey, 135 F. 725 (6th Cir. 1905) (limited partnership
association).
10. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
11. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3630
at 842 (1975). The sociedad is an entity similar to a limited partnership, created by
Puerto Rican statute. 288 U.S. at 481.
12. 288 U.S. at 477.
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federal district court claiming diversity jurisdiction under the Chapman
approach. 13 On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the district court's assertion
of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sociedad
possessed the legal characteristics of a corporation 14 and should be
considered a citizen of Puerto Rico irrespective of the citizenship of its
shareholders. 15 The Court noted, however, that unlike the treatment afforded
an unincorporated association under common law, a sociedad "is consist-
ently regarded as a juridical person" under Puerto Rico's civil law. 16 It thus
saw "no adequate reason for holding that the sociedad had a different status
for purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation organized under that
law.' 7
The effect of Russell on prior law has been the subject of dispute in the
federal courts.' 8 It has been viewed as a rejection of the rigid Chapman
formula in favor of a "legal characteristics" approach 9 or as a holding that
13. Id.
14. Id. at 481. As listed by the Russell Court, the legal characteristices of the
sociedad are: it can contract, own property, transact business, sue and be sued in its
own name; its members are not considered to be sufficiently interested parties to make
them intervenors of right should litigation arise; it is created by articles of association
filed as public records; it may endure beyond the life of its members; powers of
management may be vested in managers, who alone may be empowered to do acts
legally binding on the sociedad; the occasional imposition of personal liability on its
members of the sociedad's debts is similar to the liability imposed by some state
statutes on the shareholders of a corporation. Id.
15. Id. at 482.
16. Id. at 481.
17. Id. at 481-82. Russell spawned a number of lower federal court decisions
which held local law determinative of entity status for diversity of citizenship
purposes. See, e.g., Swan v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 225 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.
1955) (church Board of Trustees considered corporation for diversity purposes because
Massachusetts statute defines it as such); Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169
F.2d 355, 372 (3d Cir. 1947) (joint stock company permitted to be sued in own name in
federal court pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure); Luce & Co. v.
Alimentos Borinquenos, S.A., 276 F. Supp. 94 (D.P.R. 1967) (federal jurisdiction upheld
pursuant to "additional jurisdiction" statute peculiar to Puerto Rico). But see Suchem,
Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. 348 (D.P.R. 1971) (even if local law gave
the association capacity to sue or be sued, the residence of its members controlled).
18. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954) (Russell interpreted as compelling recognition of entity
status). Compare Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 871 (1960) (Russell cited as authority for the proposition that statutory
treatment as a juridical person may compel recognition of entity status for diversity
purposes) and Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 337-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 864 (1958) (labor union denied entity status for diversity despite treatment as ajuridical person in class action situation) with Swan v. First Church of Christ,
Scientist, 225 F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir. 1955) (Russell distinguished on facts and powers
of sociedad seen as more extensive than those of board of trustees) and Van Sant v.
American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1947) (Russell cited as example of erosion
of Chapman doctrine).
19. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964). For a
discussion of this case, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text infra.
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should be limited to its unique facts.2° In Mason v. American Express Co., 21
the Second Circuit held that Russell represented a clear break with
Chapman and called for a test which required an analysis of an
organization's legal characteristics and a determination of whether such
characteristics invest the organization with a juridical personality distinct
from that of its members.22 However, the Supreme Court followed Chapman
in United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc. ,23 holding that,
pursuant to the Chapman rule, the citizenship of an unincorporated labor
union is that of each of its members for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
and that any change in that rule should come from Congress and not the
courts.24 While Bouligny did not expressly overrule Mason,25 it specifically
rejected the Mason view of Russell.26 Nevertheless, Justice Fortas, writing for
20. See, e.g., Swan v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 225 F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir.
1955); Gaunt v. Lloyds America, 11 F. Supp. 787, 790 (W.D. Tex. 1935).
Another interpretation of Russell has also been suggested:
A third interpretation is possible, i.e., that Russell represents strict
compliance with Chapman. It could be reasoned that the Court was compelled to
examine the sociedad's characteristics, because of its hybird nature, in order to
determine the manner in which it was viewed under Puerto Rican law - much as
Chapman would look to the presence or absence of incorporation in order to
determine legal status.
53 GEo. L. J. 513, 515 n.18 (1965).
21. 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964). The district court had dismissed a suit brought by
a New Jersey plaintiff against a joint stock company organized under the laws of
New York because Chapman required that an identity of citizenship between plaintiff
and some of defendant's more than 20,000 members be considered violative of
complete diversity. Id. at 393.
22. Id.
23. 382 U.S. 145 (1965). In Bouligny a North Carolina corporation brought suit
against an unincorporated labor union for defamation in a North Carolina state
court. Id. at 146. Claiming Pennsylvania as its principal place of business, the union
removed the action to a federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction. Id. Despite
plaintiff's argument that complete diversity was lacking because some of the union's
members were North Carolina citizens, the district court retained jurisdiction. Id.
However, the Fourth Circuit reversed on interlocutory appeal, and ordered that the
case be remanded. Id. at 146-47. The Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 153.
24. Id. at 151-53. The Court stated:
Whether unincorporated labor unions ought to be assimilated to the status of
corporations for diversity purposes, how such citizenship is to be determined, and
what if any related rules ought to apply, are decisions which we believe suited to
the legislative and not the judicial branch, regardless of our views as to the
intrinsic merits of petitioner's argument - merits stoutly attested by widespread
support for the recognition of labor unions as juridical personalities.
Id. at 153 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 149 n.8. Indeed, Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court, cited Mason as
an example of the compelling arguments in favor of extending the availability of
diversity jurisdiction to unincorporated associations. See id.
26. Id. at 151. The Court stated that "Russell does not furnish the precedent
which petitioner seeks. The problem which it presented was that of fitting an exotic
creation of the civil law, the sociedad en comandita, into a federal scheme which knew
it not." Id. The Court noted also that in Russell jurisdiction was based on a unique
procedural statute, that a sociedad has always been considered a juridical entity
under the laws of its creation - Puerto Rico's civil law - and that plaintiff was the
Territory of Puerto Rico, not a true citizen. Id.
1977-19781
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the Bouligny Court, shortly thereafter expressed affinity with the arguments
in favor of affording unincorporated associations access to diversity
jurisdiction upon which Mason was based.27 The Court noted that many
unincorporated associations and corporations were indistinguishable in
terms of structure and function, the only difference being that of a "birth
certificate" for corporations, and "to say that the latter are juridical persons
and 'citizens' and the former are not is to base a distinction upon an
inadequate and irrelevant difference. ' 28 Nevertheless, the Court continued to
adhere to the Chapman doctrine, requiring that the unincorporated
association's citizenship be determined by the citizenship of each of its
members.29
While the Supreme Court has determined that the citizenship of an
unincorporated association is that of each of its members, the narrower
question whether the citizenship of a limited partnership3° is that of each of
its limited as well as general partners remains unresolved. The Supreme
Court has dealt directly with the citizenship of partnerships for diversity
purposes only once. In Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones,31 the
Court affirmed the applicability of Chapman to a partnership case in which
all of the partners were of a "limited" status,3 2 holding that the citizenship
of the partnership was that of each partner. 33
27. Id. at 149-50. The Court noted:
In recent years courts and commentators have reflected dissatisfaction with
the rule of Chapman v. Barney .... They assert, with considerable merit, that it
is not good judicial administration, nor is it fair, to remit a labor union or other
unincorporated association to vagaries of jurisdiction determined by the
citizenship of its members and to disregard the fact that unions and associations
may exist and have an identity and a local habitation of their own.
Id. (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 149.
29. Id. at 146-47.
30. See note 62 infra.
31. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
32. The organization in Southern Fire was a limited partnership association
organized under a Pennsylvania statute no longer in force. See id. at 450; 1874 Pa.
Laws 271 (repealed 1966). Originally created when incorporation was difficult or
impossible, limited partnership associations were statutory forms of organization
evidencing both partnership and corporate characteristics. A BROMBERG, supra note
7, § 26A. Capital was fixed by the organization documents. Id. The association was
required to include and conspicuously display the word "limited" in its name since
only the capital of the organization was responsible for the association's debts. Id.
Each member subscribed to a designated part of the capital and was not subject to
liability beyond such subscription. Id. The 1874 statute was repealed in 1966 except as
applied to professions not permitted to incorporate. Act of Jan. 18, 1966, No. 519
§50(g)(1), 1965 PA. LAws 1305. Under the current statute, limited partnership
associations have the corporate attributes of concentration of management, some
transferrability of shares, the right to sue, be sued and own property in the
association's name, and limited liability. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59 §§ 341-461 (1964).
They retain the dilectus personae feature of partnerships, however. Id.
For a detailed analysis of the limited partnership association, see, Schwartz,
The Limited Partnership Association - An Alternative to the Corporation for Small
Businesses With "Control" Problems, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 29 (1965).
33. 177 U.S. at 454, 456. The Southern Fire Court stated: "When the question
relates to the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United States as resting on the
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Despite the influence of Chapman and Southern Fire, several lower
federal courts have recently departed from the proposition that the
citizenship of a partnership is in every case that of each partner, holding
that only the citizenship of those partners who are real parties in interest
should be considered in determining the presence or absence of complete
diversity.34 Furthermore, the United States District Courts for the Eastern
District of New York35 and the Middle District of North Carolina3 6 have held
that only the citizenship of general partners is controlling for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. Prior to the instant case, however, the question of
whether the citizenship of limited partners should be considered for diversity
purposes had been addressed by only one court of appeals. In Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,3 7 a Delaware corporation brought suit against
a New York general partnership, which sought to defeat diversity
jurisdiction through its Delaware limited partner.38 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's exercise of jurisdiction, holding that a suit
diverse citizenship of the parties, we must look in the case of a suit by or against a
partnership association to the citizenship of the several persons comprising such
association." Id. at 456. Indeed, the Court asserted that "the case of Chapman v.
Barney. . .[was] decisive of the present question." Id. at 454. Southern Fire served as
precedent for numerous lower federal courts which held that the fact that a party
partnership was organized under the laws of a state, or had its principal place of
business in a state in which an opposing party held citizenship, was not violative of
complete diversity as long as none of the partners were citizens there. See, e.g.,
Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 993 (1971); A.D.S. Developers, Inc. v. Tucker, 263 F. Supp. 986, 987 (E.D. Pa.
1967); B.L. Schrader, Inc. v. Anderson Lumber Co., 257 F. Supp. 794, 796 (D. Md.
1966); Feldman Ins. Agency v. Brodsky, 195 F. Supp. 483, 486 (D. Md. 1961); Eastern
Metals Corp. v. Martin, 191 F. Supp. 245, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Simpson v. DeVault, 177
F. Supp. 914, 915 (W.D. Va. 1959).
34. See, e.g., Jones Knitting Corp. v. A.M. Pullen & Co., 50 F.RD. 311 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). In Jones Knitting, the court stated that
[t]he citizenship of a partnership, for diversity purposes, is determined not by the
citizenship of all the partners but initially by those partners who are actually
joined .... Since under New York and North Carolina law, partners are at most
necessary and not indispensable parties, plaintiff can refuse to join non-diverse
partners and can move to drop partners who prove to be non-diverse.
Id. at 315 (footnote omitted). Compare Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell,
194 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1952) (court must determine real parties in interest prior to
determining whether diversity exists), with Molasky v. Garfinkle, 380 F. Supp. 549
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (in suit against partnership, all partners, including those whose
citizenship will defeat diversity, must be counted).
35. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
The Erving court held that in a suit against a limited partnership, "for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of the general partners is controlling." Id. at
711, citing Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 993 (1971).
36. C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F.
Supp. 446 (M.D.N.C. 1974). In Robinson, a limited partner was sued for dissolution
and contribution by the general partners. Id. at 448. The court asserted that "the
citizenship of the limited partnership is determined by the citizenship of each of the
individual general partners and diversity of citizenship exists if the limited partner's
citizenship is different from that of all general partners." Id. at 449.
37. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
38. 358 F.2d at 179, 183.
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brought against a New York partnership should be considered to be solely
against the general partners, since under New York law only general
partners are considered proper parties to proceedings involving partner-
ships.39
Against this background of developing case law, the Third Circuit in
Carlsberg addressed the issue of "whether an identity of citizenship between
a number of limited partners of a plaintiff partnership and the defendants
precludes an exercise of diversity jurisdiction.' 0 Having raised the
jurisdictional issue sua sponte,41 the Carlsberg court noted that the interplay
between the necessity for complete diversity 42 and the Supreme Court's
traditional treatment of partnerships and other unincorporated associations
for purposes of diversity4 3 required that the citizenship of both general and
limited partners be considered. 44 The court initially cited Southern Fire15 as
authority for the tenet that "in dealing with partnerships, limited and
otherwise, we should look to the citizenship of the members of the
partnership to determine whether diversity of citizenship exists. ' 46 Noting
that Southern Fire did not involve partners of differing status, the court
stated that the Chapman decision implied that no differentiation between
various classes of partners should be made. 47 Moreover, the court emphas-
ized that in Bouligny48 the Supreme Court had reaffirmed the principle that
the citizenship of an unincorporated association is, for diversity jurisdiction
purposes, that of each of its members, and had established the "rather hard
39. Id. at 183-84.
40. 554 F.2d at 1255.
41. Id. at 1255-1257. In a well-documented narrative, the court cited the interests
of judicial economy and federalism as determinative of its decision to raise the issue
sua sponte. Id. at 1256-57. It noted that, pursuant to its reading of prior cases, access
to diversity jurisdiction "should be granted only where clearly appropriate." Id. at
1257, citing Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal Co., 211 U.S. 293, 302 (1908), Lehigh
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1895), and McSparran v. Weist, 402
F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968).
42. 554 F.2d at 1257-58, citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806). The court noted:
[F]or almost two centuries Strawbridge has stood for the proposition that, for
diversity jurisdiction to attach, all parties on one side of a litigation must be of a
different citizenship from all of those on the other. Put another way, the Court
formulated the precept that complete diversity is required between all parties
opposed in interest, if jurisdiction is to obtain.
554 F.2d at 1258.
43. Id. at 1258-59. As examples of the principle that courts should examine the
citizenship of the persons comprising noncorporate entities, the Carlsberg court cited
Bouligny, Southern Fire, Chapman and Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207
(1904). 554 F.2d at 1258 n.15.
44. 554 F.2d at 1257-58.
45. For a discussion of Southern Fire, see notes 31-33 and accompanying text
supra.
46. 554 F.2d at 1258 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 1259.
48. For a discussion of Bouligny, see notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
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line" 49 that the existing doctrine should be followed until Congress changed
it.5o
After observing that the Supreme Court had never addressed the precise
question posed in Carlsberg,51 the Third Circuit explained its refusal to
follow the Second Circuit's decision in Colonial Realty.52 Central to the
court's analysis was the fact that the Colonial Realty holding was based
upon a state statute which denied limited partners capacity to sue or be sued
in relation to partnership matters except in specific situations.53 Unlike the
Second Circuit, the Carlsberg court concluded that capacity and jurisdiction
are distinct issues, and that the former should not be addressed until the
latter is resolved.5 4 The court also noted disapprovingly that adoption of the
Colonial Realty view would subject diversity jurisdiction to the "vagaries of
state law."55 Finally, since it could discern no support for the Second
Circuit's position from either the Supreme Court or Congress,56 the
Carlsberg court chose "the traditional treatment of partnerships," and
concluded that the complaint was properly dismissed for want of diversity.57
In his dissent, Judge Hunter disagreed with the majority's view that
jurisdictional considerations should be resolved before capacity to sue is
49. 554 F.2d at 1259.
50. Id., citing United Steelworkers of America v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,
147, 150 (1965).
51. 554 F.2d at 1259. The court stated, "[W]e recognize that the three leading
Supreme Court cases in this area [Chapman, Southern Fire, Bouligny], which have
been discussed above, do not squarely address the exact question posed here - in
effect, whether partners of divergent status may be treated differently for purposes of
an evaluation regarding diversity of citizenship." Id.
52. Id. at 1260-62. For a discussion of Colonial Realty, see notes 37-39 and
accompanying text supra.
53. 554 F.2d at 1260.
54. Id. The court opined that for this reason "the Supreme Court ... has declined
to view problems involving diversity jurisdiction through the perspective of capacity
to sue." Id. (footnote omitted), citing Miller & Lux Inc. v. East Side Canal Co., 211 U.S.
293 (1908), Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895), McSparran v.
Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 870 (3d Cir. 1968), Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 338, 341
(3d Cir. 1958), and 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 17.25, at 862-69 (1976).
Furthermore, the Carlsberg court suggested that the Colonial Realty court
looked to New York law because of the mandate in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(b). 554 F.2d at 1261. This rule provides, in pertinent part, that, "capacity to sue or
be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held
.... "FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). The court noted, however, that such reference may run
afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82. 554 F.2d at 1261. This rule states that the
"rules [of civil' procedure] shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of
the United States district courts ... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 82. The court argued that to
ignore an identity of citizenship for federal diversity purposes because New York
limited partners have no capacity to sue in federal court pursuant to rule 17(b)
expands the jurisdiction of the district courts in direct violation of rule 82. 554 F.2d at
1261.
55. 554 F.2d at 1261. The court stated that "[a]vailability of diversity jurisdiction
... ordinarily should not rest upon considerations of state law but rather upon
uniform and readily cognizable principles of general application." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1262. The court reiterated the policy reasons of judicial economy and
federalism as militating against the adoption of the Colonial Realty view. Id.
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addressed.58 The dissent maintained that it was impossible to determine the
citizenship of a partnership without first ascertaining the identity of the real
parties, those with capacity to bring suit.59 Noting that the Supreme Court
had never addressed the status question presented in the instant case,6° the
dissent asserted that the Supreme Court cases cited by the majority were
irrelevant.6' Judge Hunter made a detailed analysis of the difference
between general and limited partners and argued that it was illogical to take
cognizance of limited partners for diversity purposes since they are denied
capacity to sue or be sued in connection with partnership matters under
state law.62 Finally he discounted the majority's fear that basing jurisdic-
tional considerations on state capacity to sue rules would enable state courts
and legislators to determine the perimeters of federal court jurisdiction,
noting that "the federal court has appropriate safeguards against 'manufac-
tured' jurisdiction,"63
58. Id. at 1264 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Hunter stated: "I am not troubled,
as the majority purports to be, by Judge Friendly's decision in Colonial Realty. . .to
engraft 'capacity-to-sue rules to the traditional requirements of diversity jurisdic-
tion.' Indeed, I can envision no other sensible way to proceed." Id. at 1264.
59. Id. at 1263 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1264 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1265 (Hunter, J. dissenting). Judge Hunter noted that:
The purpose of limited partners is to allow some contributors of capital to be
given a fixed return on their investment without having any voice in the
management of the business. In return, the limited contributors are protected
from the unlimited liability general partners face. As the Official Comments to
section one of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act make clear:
[ * . T]he person who contributes the capital, though in accordance with
custom [is] called a limited partner, is not in any sense a partner. He is,
however, a member of the association.
In keeping with their restricted role, limited partners cannot take part in the
management of the business, and cannot be included in a suit by or against the
partnership. Section 26, adopted nationwide, provides:
A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to
proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce
a limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership.
Id. (footnotes omitted), quoting UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 1, comments,
and id. § 26 (emphasis added by the court). For cases in which a limited partner has
attempted to sue on behalf of a partnership see Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky,
25 App. Div. 2d 291, 268 N.Y.S.2d 854, aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277
N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966) (limited partners permitted to bring action on behalf of
partnership since those in control of business wrongfully declined to do so); Beddolla
v. Logan & Fraer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 128, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 66 (1975) (general rule
that limited partner cannot sue without becoming liable as a general partner).
63. 554 F.2d at 1265-66 (Hunter, J., dissenting). The dissent remarked that the
federal judiciary had faced this problem before, in situations where state law allows
appointment of out-of-state executors, and had dealt with it through safeguards
against manufactured jurisdiction. Id. Judge Hunter went on to state, "Here, it takes
some imagination to believe that limited partnerships would be created in deliberate
anticipation of a need for diversity jurisdiction. But even if that did occur, the federal
courts are equipped to deal with it, under 28 U.S.C. § 1359." 554 F.2d at 1266 citing
Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969) (application of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 to
collusive assignment).
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In Carlsberg, the Third Circuit aligned partnership law with the general
rule that the citizenship of an unincorporated association is that of each of
its members. Since the court's holding was based largely on its reading of
prior case law, stare decisis was respected.64 It is submitted, however, that
since the status question has never been addressed by the Supreme Court,65
the majority's analysis perpetuates the failure to distinguish between
general and limited partnerships. As the dissent emphasized, the two are
wholly different entities: "[I]t is .the general partners who function as
ordinary partners - the limited partners are a distinct breed." 66
Since this distinction is central to the instant case, the court's reliance
on Southern Fire, Chapman and Bouligny67 seems inapposite. While the
court noted that the partnership involved in Southern Fire was one in which
all partners had the same status, 68 it nevertheless read Southern Fire as
authority for the proposition that the citizenship of a partnership, "limited
or otherwise," is that of its members.69 In light of the absence of Supreme
Court treatment of the status question, the Carlsberg court's position that
Chapman implied that the citizenship of all partners should be considered,
regardless of status, is subject to criticism. 70 The court's reliance on
Bouligny for reaffirmation of the Chapman doctrine disregarded the fact
that the Bouligny case involved a labor union rather than a partnership, did
not address the status question, and expressed sympathy for the arguments
64. See notes 45-50 and accompanying text supra.
65. 554 F.2d at 1264 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1264-65 (Hunter, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the difference
between general and limited partners, see note 62 supra.
67. For a discussion of the court's interpretation of these cases, see notes 45-50
and accompanying text supra.
68. 554 F.2d at 1258. See note 32 supra.
69. 554 F.2d at 1259. However, the Southern Fire court rejected the argument that
a partnership should be given citizenship as an entity apart from that of its members
for diversity purposes. See 177 U.S. at 456. As all partners there involved were of the
same status, the status question was never addressed. See id.
70. 554 F.2d at 1259. However, a close reading of Chapman shows this
interpretation to be rather surprising. As the Carlsberg dissent noted:
Chapman also faced, and rejected, an "entity" argument. Nowhere did the Court
indicate, as the majority suggests, that an argument had been made that only
the president's citizenship should be considered. The entire discussion is as
follows:
On looking into the record we find no satisfactory showing as to the
citizenship of the plaintiff. The allegation of the amended petition is, that the
United States Express Company is a joint stock company organized under a
law of the State of New York, and is a citizen of that State. But the express
company cannot be a citizen of New York, within the meaning of the statutes
regulating jurisdiction, unless it be a corporation. The allegation that the
company was organized under the laws of New York is not an allegation
that it is a corporation. In fact, the allegation is, that the company is not a
corporation, but a joint-stock company - that is, a mere partnership. And,
although it may be authorized by the laws of the State of New York to bring
suit in the name of its president, that fact cannot give the company power,
by that name, to sue in a Federal court.
554 F.2d at 1264 n.7 (Hunter, J., dissenting), quoting Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S.
677, 682 (1889).
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in favor of extending diversity jurisdiction to unincorporated associations.71
By applying the Chapman doctrine to the facts in Carlsberg, the Third
Circuit neglected a particularly suitable opportunity to rule in the spirit of
Bouligny.72 Had it held that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction the
citizenship of a limited partnership did not include its limited partners, the
Carl8berg court would have remained consistent with the "meritorious"
arguments in favor of extending diversity jurisdiction enumerated in
Bouligny73 without encountering the difficulties that such an extension to
labor unions would involve.74 It is submitted that these difficulties, rather
than preclusion by Chapman, were the basis for the Bouligny Court's
deference to Congress to change the Chapman doctrine.
75
71. See 554 F.2d at 1264 (Hunter, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Bouligny, see
notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
72. The Bouligny Court sympathized with the arguments in favor of extending
diversity jurisdiction where feasible. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
74. The Bouligny Court rejected the argument that a labor union should be treated
as a citizen, qua entity, for diversity purposes. 382 U.S. at 152-53. An opposite ruling
would have engendered numerous problems: the Court would have had to create a test
to determine the state of which the labor union, as an entity, was a citizen. Id. The
fact that labor unions have both national and local organizations would have vastly
complicated the matter as well. Id. The court considered such determinations better
suited for legislative resolution. Id. at 152-53. It is submitted that the instant case is
devoid of such problems since the courts could look to the state law under which the
partnership is organized for an indication of citizenship as well as for a determination
of the nature of the partnership and the various duties, powers, relative capacities, etc.
of the members.
75. Justice Fortas noted in Bouligny that:
If we were to accept petitioner's urgent invitation to amend diversity
jurisdiction so as to accommodate its case, we would be faced with difficulties
which we could not adequately resolve .... We should, for example, be obliged
to fashion a test for ascertaining of which State the labor union is a citizen.
Extending the jurisdiction to corporations raised no such problem, for the state
of incorporation was a natural candidate .... Further, in contemplating a rule
which would accommodate petitioner's claim, we are acutely aware of the
complications arising from the circumstances that petitioner, like other labor
unions, has local as well as national organizations and that these, perhaps,
should be reckoned with in connection with "citizenship" and its juridical
incidents.
Whether unincorporated labor unions ought to be assimilated to the status of
corporations for diversity purposes, how such citizenship is to be determined, and
what, if any related rules ought to apply, are decisions which we believe suited to
the legislative and not the judicial branch, regardless of our views as to the
intrinsic merits of petitioner's argument ....
382 U.S. at 152-53 (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, the Court noted that Russell also did not provide a relevant
precedent for extension of diversity jurisdiction under the Bouligny facts, stating:
[Tihis Court held that the sociedad itself, not its members, was the party, doing
so on a basis that is of no help to petitioner [in Bouligny]. It did so because, as
Justice Stone stated for the Court, in "[tihe tradition of the civil law, as expressed
in the Code of Puerto Rico," "the sociedad is consistently regarded as a juridical
person."
Id. at 151, quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480-81. It is submitted
that the Carlsberg court could have read Russell as providing the requisite precedent
for extending diversity jurisdiction. Just as the sociedad was given entity status
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Another analytical difficulty arises from the Carlsberg court's position
that citizenship must be determined prior to consideration of a party's
capacity to sue.76 The dissent remarked, "I fail to see.., how a court knows
whose citizenship to count without first determining who the parties are. By
'parties' I mean real parties, those who have the capacity to bring suit....
No one can examine citizenship in vacuo."77 Indeed, prior to Carlsberg the
Third Circuit had held that a party who has the capacity to sue under state
law is the one whose citizenship will be determinative of diversity.7 8
Furthermore, the Third Circuit had previously followed state law on a
jurisdictional question, refusing to certify a class action because state law
allowed suit to be brought only by an entity, not by a class.7 9 Limited
partnerships being creatures of state law, it seems illogical to ignore the
state law that shapes them.80 Additionally, the majority's argument that
giving weight to such considerations would give state courts and legislators
power to determine the perimeters of federal jurisdiction 81 loses credibility in
light of the dissent's reminder that the federal courts are equipped to deal
with such problems.8 2
Despite these weaknesses, Carlsberg will have significant impact on the
issue of citizenship of partnerships for diversity purposes due to the dearth
of other relevant decisions. Since the views of the Second and Third Circuits
are diametrically opposed, the stage is set for resolution of the conflict by the
Supreme Court. Should the Carlsberg view prevail, many limited partner-
ships would effectively be foreclosed from federal diversity forums8 3 despite
because the law under which it was organized regarded it as such, the Carlsberg
limited partners could be regarded as legally irrelevant because the law under which
the partnership was organized regards them as such. See 288 U.S. at 482.
76. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
77. 554 F.2d at 1263 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
78. See Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955), di8cussed in 6 C. WIGHr &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1556 (1971). The Third Circuit has
recognized an exception to this rule, counting the citizenship of a minor real party in
interest, but only because his guardian, the individual with capacity under state law,
was collusively appointed for purposes of prosecuting a diversity action. See,
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
Thus Fallat was disapproved only to the extent that it fostered "manufactured"
diversity. Id. at 876.
79. See Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 337-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 864 (1958). In Underwood, a labor union attempted to bring a class suit. The
Third Circuit refused certification because under state law a labor union is permitted
to sue only as an entity, not as a class. 256 F.2d at 337-38.
80. The dissent noted that, "We must use state law on members' rights and
responsibilities before we can rationally decide whom to 'count' for diversity." 554
F.2d at 1264 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Cf. Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974) (administrator under state law is merely a nominal
plaintiff); Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972).
81. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
82. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
83. For example, the limited partnership involved in Carlsberg had approxi-
mately 1500 limited partners throughout the country. 413 F. Supp. at 882. Thus,
adherence to the Carlsberg decision would indeed lighten the federal caseload.
Chief Justice Burger has announced that the Judicial Conference of the
United States will recommend to Congress that diversity jurisdiction be abolished.
1977-1978)
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/10
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the adoption by every state and the Virgin Islands of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act.s4 This act, which resembles a partnership statute but is
specifically designed to distinguish between classes of partners, establishes
a detailed mechanism whereby partnerships can be formed without
subjecting all members to unlimited liability.85 Under Carlsberg, however,
limited partnerships would continue to be treated like traditional partner-
ships, regardless of the many differences between these two entities which
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act went to such great lengths to
establish. 86
Dieter G. Struzyna
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - SHERMAN ACT CLAIM - FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) AND 12(b)(6) - PRETRIAL DISMISSAL OF SHERMAN ACT CLAIM
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION HELD PREMATURE WHERE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE NEXUS Is REQUISITE ELEMENT OF BOTH
JURISDICTION AND SUCCESS ON THE MERITS.
Mortensen v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association (1977)
Plaintiffs, Bent and Lise Mortensen, applied to First Federal Savings &
Loan Association (First Federal) for a home mortgage' and, as a condition
of receiving the mortgage, were required to pay First Federal's attorneys for
related legal services.2 The plaintiffs instituted a civil antitrust suit in the
The announcement was reported in the Public Information Office of the United States
Supreme Court Release of March 11, 1977. This factor suggests a reason why the
Supreme Court might be inclined to adopt the Carlsberg view.
84. 6 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 561. Judge Hunter noted the widespread adoption of
this act in his dissent. 554 F.2d at 1262-63 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
85. See 6 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 561; note 62 supra.
86. 6 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 561.
1. Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
60,570 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 549 F.2d 884 (3d
Cir. 1977). The plaintiffs applied for the mortgage to finance the purchase of a
residence in Westfield, New Jersey. 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH), at 67,496. First Federal
is a federally chartered lending institution which confines its lending activity almost
exclusively to New Jersey, although it is permitted to finance New York properties
within a 100-mile radius of its home office in Westfield. Id. at 67,498. In light of its
proximity to New York, however, First Federal does compete with New York lending
institutions that finance purchases of real estate in the Westfield area. Id. First
Federal obtains substantial funds from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), which is headquartered outside New Jersey, and some of its loans are
guaranteed by federal agencies and corporations, also based outside the state. Id.
2. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 886 (3d Cir.
1977). These legal services included "examining and certifying title, drafting and
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United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against First
Federal, its directors, and its law firm, Johnstone & O'Dwyer,3 alleging a
conspiracy resulting in an unlawful tie-in of legal services in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act (section 1).4
The defendants filed pretrial motions5 to dismiss the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6), respectively.8 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs'
recording the mortgage, and closing title in the buyer." Id. The mortgagor could hire
additional counsel, but First Federal's attorney's fees still had to be paid since they
were automatically deducted from the amount of the loan. Id.
3. See id. The plaintiffs later moved to amend their complaint to add as a
defendant the Guardian Abstract Company, a title insurance company alleged to be
controlled by Johnstone & O'Dwyer. See id. at 886 n.3. This motion and others were
heard by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. See id. at 888.
For a discussion of the other motions, see notes 5-7 and accompanying text infra.
Because the district court dismissed the Sherman Act claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the motion to amend was not addressed. See 549 F.2d at 888-89.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); see 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH), at 67,496. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
The plaintiffs alleged that defendants' antitrust violation consisted of their
participation in a tying arrangement whereby consumers were forced to purchase one
product - the legal services - in order to purchase another product - the mortgage.
549 F.2d at 886. An illegal tying arrangement has been defined as "an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
from any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
Tying arrangements may be per se unreasonable and thus illegal under the Sherman
Act "whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying
product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and
a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected." Id. at 6. See also
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). If a tying arrangement is
not per se unreasonable, however, it still may be illegal if the plaintiff can prove, on
the basis of a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects of the practices
involved, that there has been an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
499-500 (1969) (Fortner I).
The defendants argued that the arrangement was not an illegal tying
arrangement because the legal services were performed for First Federal and,
therefore, were merely an internal cost of the mortgage and not a separate, tied
product. 549 F.2d at 887.
In addition to the Sherman Act claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the conduct
of the defendants violated the FHLBB regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.35(a)(3), 571.7(b)
(1977), and the New Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9 (West 1977). 549 F.2d
at 886. For a discussion of these claims, see note 7 infra. For a discussion of the Third
Circuit's disposition of these claims, see note 9 infra.
5. The defendants also moved to stay the proceedings pending exhaustion of
administrative remedies for the alleged FHLBB violations, and, in the alternative, for
summary judgment under rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 549 F.2d
at 888. The plaintiffs moved for class action certification and to amend their
complaint to add another defendant. See id. See also note 3 supra.
6. See 549 F.2d at 888. Rule 12(b) provides in part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
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Sherman Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the
defendants' activities neither occurred in nor substantially affected
interstate commerce.7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit" vacated the dismissal of the complaint and remanded for
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter... (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted .
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). For a discussion of the operation of these rules, see notes 16-23
and accompanying text infra.
7. 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH), at 67,499-500. In the district court's two-step
analysis on the subject matter jurisdiction issue, it determined first whether the
defendants' activities occurred in interstate commerce, and second, if they did not,
whether defendants' conduct nevertheless substantially affected interstate commerce.
Id. at 67,498. For a discussion of the development of these tests for determining
whether jurisdiction exists under the Sherman Act, see note 12 infra.
To support jurisdiction under the first test, the district court noted the
following facts upon which the plaintiffs relied:
(1) [First Federal]... obtains both investment funds and depositors' insurance
from interstate sources and some of its customers' loans are guaranteed by
federal agencies and enterprises based without the State, (2) perhaps 25% of its
customers originate their loans while residing outside New Jersey, and (3) it
competes in the local real estate financing market with New York lending
institutions.
1975-2 TRADE CAs. (CCH), at 67,498 (citation omitted). In concluding that real estate
financing is "essentially a local enterprise," the district court determined that the
three factors listed above were not sufficient to bring First Federal within the flow of
interstate commerce. Id. at 67,498-99, citing Beck v. Athens Bldg. Loan & Sav. Ass'n,
65 F.R.D. 691,693 (M.D. Pa. 1974), Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 975, 981 (E.D. Pa. 1973), Spens v. Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F.
Supp. 1161, 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1973), and Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353
F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973).
Under the second test, the district court considered the plaintiffs' allegations
of the interstate effects of the defendants' activities and concluded that no substantial
interstate effects were likely to result since First Federal is a single lender possessing
little or no power over the market, and only the market for legal services - the tied
product - and not the market for credit - the tying product - was likely to be
affected. 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH), at 67,500, citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). For a discussion of the Northern Pacific case and tying
arrangements generally, see note 4 supra.
In addition, the district court distinguished the instant case from Doctors, Inc.
v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973), noted in 20 ViLL. L. REv. 426 (1975). In
Doctors, the Third Circuit found that subject matter jurisdiction existed where the
plaintiff, a buyer of a substantial amount of supplies from out-of-state companies,
alleged that the defendants' conduct would result in the termination of plaintiffs
business and thereby have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 490 F.2d at 49.
The district court noted, however, that the plaintiffs in Mortensen were alleging, not
that they or any of defendant's competitors bought substantially in interstate
commerce, but that the defendants were the ones involved in interstate borrowing
activities. 1975-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH), at 67,501. Furthermore, the court observed,
defendants' conduct did not appear likely to substantially decrease or increase their
interstate business. Id.
The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' FHLBB claim, without
prejudice, because it found those claims to be within the primary jurisdiction of the
FHLBB. Id. at 67,502. In addition, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim
under the New Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9 (West 1977), since there
was no longer any federal ground for the suit. 1975-2 TRADE CAs. (CCH), at 67,502,
citing United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
8. The case was heard by CVicuit Judges Van Dusen, Hunter, and Weis. Judge
Hunter wrote the opinion.
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further proceedings, holding that the plaintiffs' allegations of interstate
impact were sufficient to withstand a pretrial motion to dismiss the
Sherman Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.9 Mortensen v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977).
Section l's prohibition of contracts, combinations, and conspiracies "in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States"'1 has caused
considerable procedural confusion," particularly where the issue is subject
matter jurisdiction over a Sherman Act controversy. 2 The difficulty results
9. 549 F,2d at 892. In addition, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that the FHLBB claims were under the primary jurisdiction of the FHLBB
and remanded the Sherman Act claim with instructions to the district court to
consider staying that action pending the FHLBB's determination. Id. at 898-900; see
notes 4 & 7 supra.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Sherman Act was passed by Congress pursuant to
the commerce clause of the Constitution. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
For a discussion of the courts' interpretation of the Sherman Act and the commerce
power, see note 12 infra.
11. See Comment, The Confusing World of Interstate Commerce and Jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act - A Look at the Development and Future of the Currently
Employed Jurisdictional Tests, 21 VILL. L. REv. 721, 724 (1976).
12. Although this casenote will not discuss the jurisdictional reach of the
Sherman Act, it should be noted that court decisions with respect to that issue have
also been contradictory. Early decisions of the Supreme Court tended to restrict the
scope of the Sherman Act, but its jurisdictional reach has since been expanded. See id.
at 721-24. Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (local
manufacture of sugar is not "commerce" under the Sherman Act even though the
sugar is later sold almost exclusively in interstate commerce), with Mandeville Island
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (local manufacture of sugar
is commerce under the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce).
The expansion of the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act is attributable
to the intention of Congress to exercise its full power under the commerce clause when
it enacted the statute; thus, as the Supreme Court's conception of Congress' commerce
power expanded, the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act followed. See Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944); Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n,
472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1972). But see Note, Portrait of
the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 323 (1975). This
article notes that the courts, without any apparent justification from the legislative
history of the Sherman Act, have occasionally limited its jurisdictional reach to less
than the full extent of Congress' commerce power. Id. at 325.
The Supreme Court's traditional test for jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
was whether or not the activities in question were "in the flow of interstate
commerce." See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) (the
"current of commerce" includes the whole of a transaction, not just the part where the
product actually crosses state lines). Since 1942, the Supreme Court has found even
purely local activities to be within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act if the conduct
substantially affects interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See also Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); United States v. Employing Plasterers
Ass'n 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336
U.S. 460, 461-62 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 232-33 (1948). See generally Furgeson, The Commerce Test for Jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1052 (1975).
The expansion of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, however, has been in
marked contrast to the courts' treatment of jurisdiction under the other antitrust acts.
See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13,
13a-13c, 21a (1976). For a comparative analysis of jurisdiction under these three acts,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974); Comment, supra
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from the fact that the same language in section I defines both the prohibited
conduct and the jurisdictional reach of the statute."3
Since an interstate commerce nexus is required both to establish
jurisdiction and to succeed on the merits," pretrial allegations of the
absence of the requisite connection can be made by a rule 12(b)(1) motion,
challenging the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the claim,
or by a rule 12(b)(6) motion, attacking the legal sufficiency of the claim.15 In
light of this flexibility, the procedural differences between the two motions is
often significant.
In considering the jurisdictional question raised by a rule 12(b)(1)
motion, lower federal courts have extensive discretionary authority to
determine the timing and scope of their review. 16 In particular, the court has
discretion to postpone the resolution of this issue until a decision is reached
on the merits - especially where the jurisdictional facts are intertwined
with the substantive facts, 7 or where further discovery is necessary to
develop the facts required for a decision.' 8 In addition, the court may
consider evidence outside the pleadings in its determination of jurisdiction
under a rule 12(b)(1) motion and need not accept the nonmovant's
allegations as true.' 9
In contrast, where the court is evaluating the legal sufficiency of a claim
on the basis of a rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must take all of the plaintiffs
allegations as true2° and may not dismiss the claim unless there is no set of
facts on which a claim can be based.2' In addition, if matters outside the
pleadings are considered by the court, it must treat the motion as one for
summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.22 Thus, the
note 11, at 726 n.36; Note, Jurisdictional Requirements of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Antitrust Acts: A Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
27 U. FLA. L. REv. 871 (1975).
13. See Comment, supra note 11, at 724.
14. Id.
15. See notes 16-23 and accompanying text infra.
16. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939). In the words of the Court, "[a]s there is
no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its
determination is left to the trial court." Id. at 71-72.
17. See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1947) (district court has
discretion to postpone jurisdictional question until a decision is reached on the merits
where jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits).
18. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350
(1969) (hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
19. See id. (only uncontroverted factual allegations will be taken as true under a
rule 12(b)(1) motion).
20. See id. at § 1357.
21. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In Conley, the Court held that "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." Id.
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Rule 12(b) provides in pertinent part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
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procedure under a rule 12(b)(6) motion offers many more safeguards to the
plaintiff, and, in complex antitrust cases where the facts are often in the
hands of the defendants, such pretrial procedures may be vital to a
plaintiff's case.2 3
As a result of the considerations outlined above - the inextricable
interrelationship of the jurisdictional question with the merits in Sherman
Act cases and the procedural advantages available to the plaintiff under a
rule 12(b)(6) motion as compared to a rule 12(b)(1) motion - many circuit
courts have recently opted either to decide Sherman Act jurisdictional
questions on the basis of a rule 12(b)(6) motion or to postpone such
determinations until a trial on the merits. 24 The Fourth Circuit, for example,
has stated that it generally disapproves of dismissals on the pleadings in
antitrust cases and that, if the question of jurisdiction is decided prior to
trial, it should be done on the basis of a rule 12(b)(6) motion or a rule 56
motion.25 Thus, where it was unclear whether the district court had
dismissed the complaint on the basis of a rule 12(b)(1) motion or a rule
12(b)(6) motion, the Fourth Circuit, in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of
Rex Hospital,26 treated the dismissal as though it had been on the basis of a
rule 12(b)(6) motion. 27 Although the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit's decision on the merits, it did not criticize that court for treating the
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Id. The relevant portion of Rule 56(c) provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962). In
Poller, the Supreme Court, stressing that because "motive and intent play leading
roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile
witnesses thicken the plot," cautioned that even the procedures under a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 should be used sparingly in antitrust cases -
a trial is preferred so that the parties will have the opportunity to present their
witnesses and cross-examine the opponent's witnesses. Id. at 473.
24. See notes 25-30 and accompanying text infra.
25. See, e.g., Mines v. Kemp, 516 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1975); Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S.
738 (1976). For a discussion of Hospital Building, see notes 26-28 and accompanying
text infra.
26. 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
27. 511 F.2d at 680-81. In Hospital Building, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to control the number of hospital beds and
the allocation of patients, and to otherwise unreasonably restrain the market for
"surgical-medical hospital services" in the Raleigh, North Carolina area. Id. at 681.
Despite its general disapproval of dismissals on the pleadings in antitrust cases, the
Fourth Circuit found that even if the plaintiffs had proved all of their allegations,
neither of the jurisdictional tests under the Sherman Act would have been met, since
the conduct of the defendants was aimed at the intrastate, not the interstate, activity
of the plaintiffs. Id. at 682. For a discussion of the jurisdictional tests under the
Sherman Act, see note 12 supra.
1977-1978]
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/10
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
dismissal as one under a rule 12(b)(6) motion. 28 The Fifth Circuit has
enunciated a policy similar to the Fourth Circuit's, stating that when the
jurisdictional and substantive facts are intertwined in Sherman Act cases,
the jurisdictional question should be "referred to the merits," 29 indicating
that the postponement of the jurisdictional issue is required primarily to
afford the plaintiff an opportunity to present the relevant evidence.30
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, unlike the Fourth and Fifth Circuits,
have emphasized that the jurisdictional question in Sherman Act cases is
distinct from the substantive issues and should be decided separately.31 On
the basis of this distinction, the Ninth Circuit has held that in most
Sherman Act cases it is the function of the court to decide the jurisdictional
question on the basis of a rule 12(b)(1) motion.3 2 Even where it might be
proper to submit the jurisdictional question to the jury,3 3 the Ninth Circuit
has emphasized that the trial court must give the jury "adequate
instructions as to the legal standard to be applied. '34 The Seventh Circuit,
while agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that the jurisdictional issue in
Sherman Act cases can and should be separated from the substantive
issues,3 5 has recently held that the courts must still provide antitrust
28. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 742 n.1 (1976). In
reversing the Fourth Circuit on the merits, the Supreme Court disagreed with the two
reasons given by the Fourth Circuit for its decision. The Fourth Circuit found the
effect on interstate commerce to be too indirect to support a Sherman Act challenge,
but the Supreme Court noted that "the fact that an effect on interstate commerce
might be termed 'indirect' because the conduct producing it is not 'purposely directed'
toward interstate commerce does not lead to a conclusion that the conduct at issue is
outside the scope of the Sherman Act." Id. at 744, citing Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320
(1967). See 511 F.2d at 682. The Fourth Circuit also found the effect on interstate
commerce to be insufficient because the defendant's conduct was not likely to affect
the market price or to cause any company to fold. Id. at 684. The Supreme Court,
nevertheless, held that "an effect can be 'substantial' under the Sherman Act even if
its impact on interstate commerce falls far short of causing enterprises to fold or
affecting market price." 425 U.S. at 745.
29. McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 363
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967).
30. See Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975) (district court's dismissal of Sherman Act claim reversed
where the facts were not fully developed since the question of jurisdiction could not,
therefore, be conclusively decided). See also Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972) (district court's dismissal of a
private antitrust suit for lack of jurisdiction affirmed where plaintiff failed to present
proof of jurisdiction although he had ample time and opportunity to do so).
31. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1973); Cherney Disposal Co.
v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Ass'n, 484 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 887 (1974); Rasmussen v. American
Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
32. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. See id. The Ninth Circuit, in Gough, indicated that it would be proper to
submit the jurisdictional issue to the jury only where the factual and jurisdictional
issues were "completely intermeshed." Id., citing McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens
for Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967).
34. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1973).
35. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Ass'n, 484 F.2d
751, 757-59 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 887
(1974).
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plaintiffs with more procedural safeguards than are ordinarily provided
under a rule 12(b)(1) motion.36 These safeguards must include ample time
and opportunity to present the jurisdictional proof, and an assurance that
the appellate court will favorably consider all of the evidence in support of
the plaintiff's asserted cause of action when reviewing a dismissal of that
claim for lack of jurisdiction.37
The Supreme Court decisions discussing the issue of the appropriate
procedure for evaluating pretrial motions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction in Sherman Act cases offer no definitive statements,
seemingly leaving a resolution of the issue to the lower courts. Although the
Court has counseled that summary procedures should be used sparingly in
complex antitrust cases,38 it has also emphasized that pretrial dismissals
may be appropriate in certain circumstances, which were not articulated.3 9
In addition, although the Supreme Court has never expressly held that
jurisdictional challenges in Sherman Act cases should be considered under a
rule 12(b)(6) motion rather than under a rule 12(b)(1) motion, in at least one
case, the Court did not criticize such a practice.4 0
36. 484 F.2d at 759-60. In Cherney Disposal, the district court treated the
defendant's motion for summary judgment as a rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack ofjurisdiction and dismissed on that basis. See id. at 752-54 n.12. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that since the jurisdictional facts were in dispute, the decision on
the jurisdictional issue could not be made until both parties had been given ample
opportunity to present evidence on this point. Id. at 759. The Seventh Circuit further
stated that in Sherman Act cases:
Unlike the rule governing us on the usual appeal, where we are required to
look with favor on all evidence supporting the decision of the trier of fact, we
must here carefully and favorably consider all evidence tendered in support of
the plaintiffs' asserted cause of action, to determine if under any possible theory
they have plead [sic] facts sufficient to entitle them to avoid a motion for
summary judgment, or a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at 759-60.
37. Id. at 759-60.
38. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). For a
discussion of Poller, see note 23 supra.
39. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 203 (1974). Although the
Supreme Court limited its inquiry in Gulf Oil to the plaintiffs' claims under the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, it contrasted the jurisdictional prerequisites
under those statutes with those under the Sherman Act. Id. at 194-95; see note 12
supra. In a note, the Court briefly addressed the question of the procedure to be used
in deciding the jurisdictional issue in antitrust cases, and concluded that there is "no
objection to reserving the jurisdictional issues until a hearing on the merits [where
there is an identity between the jurisdictional and substantive issues]. By the same
token, however, there is no objection to use, in appropriate cases, of summaryjudgment procedure to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to the interstate commerce elements." 419 U.S. at 203 n.19.
40. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976). The Court in
Hospital Building observed that, regardless of how the motion was treated, the
"critical inquiry" was that of "the adequacy of the nexus between respondents'
conduct and interstate commerce that is alleged in the complaint." Id. at 742 n.1. For
a discussion of Hospital Building, see notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
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Faced with the conflicting opinions in the circuits4' and the lack of a
definitive statement by the Supreme Court,42 the Third Circuit welcomed the
opportunity 43 presented by Mortensen to discuss "the propriety of treating a
motion to dismiss a Sherman Act claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in the same manner as other claims whose jurisdictional bases
are not as intertwined with their merits."
4
The Mortensen court began its analysis by examining the motions
available to litigants to challenge the jurisdictional basis of a Sherman Act
claim - the "factual" rule 12(b)(1) motion 45 andthe rule 12(b)(6) motion. 46 In
noting the different procedural safeguards available to plaintiffs when their
claims are attacked on the basis of these motions, 47 the Third Circuit
41. 549 F.2d at 893-94. After an extensive review of other circuit decisions, the
Third Circuit concluded that confusion was generated by the intertwining of
jurisdictional and substantive facts in Sherman Act cases. Id. at 894. For an historical
discussion of other circuit decisions, see notes 25-37 and accompanying text supra.
42. 549 F.2d at 895. For a discussion of the Supreme Court precedent, see notes
38-40 and accompanying text supra.
43. The Third Circuit observed that it had not been presented with this precise
issue before. 549 F.2d at 892. It noted, however, that it had considered related issues in
the past. Id. at 892 n.18.
44. Id. at 890.
45. Id. at 891. The Third Circuit emphasized that there is a "crucial distinction"
between a "facial" rule 12(b)(1) motion and a "factual" rule 12(b)(1) motion. Id. The
court stated that a facial rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the complaint on its face and
asserts that the allegations in the complaint, even if taken as true, are insufficient to
show that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Id. The factual rule
12(b)(1) motion, however, attacks the existence of the court's subject matter
jurisdiction in fact. Id. The former motion merely alleges a defect in the complaint,
and, normally, the court will grant leave to amend the complaint to cure the defect.
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, at § 1350.
46. 549 F.2d at 891.
47. Id. at 891-92. The Third Circuit observed that the factual 12(b)(1) motion
affords the plaintiff few procedural safeguards, stating that:
Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction - its
very power to hear the case - there is substantial authority that the trial court is
free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to
hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiffs
allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the
trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover,
the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.
Id. at 891. For a discussion of the rule 12(b)(1) motion, see notes 16-19 and
accompanying text supra. See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, at § 1350. In
contrast, the Third Circuit noted the many safeguards available under a 12(b)(6)
motion, stating that:
Because 12(b)(6) results in a determination on the merits at an early stage of
plaintiff's case, the plaintiff is afforded the safeguard of having all its
allegations taken as true and all inferences favorable to plaintiff will be drawn.
The decision disposing the case is then purely on the legal sufficiency of
plaintiffs case: even were plaintiff to prove all its allegations, he or she would be
unable to prevail. In the interests of judicial economy it is not improper to
dispose of the claim at that stage. If the court considers matters outside the
pleadings before it in a 12(b)(6) motion, the above procedure will automatically be
converted into a Rule 56 summary judgment procedure. Here there are further
safeguards for the plaintiff: in addition to having all of plaintiffs allegations
taken as true, with all their favorable inferences, the trial court cannot grant a
summary judgment unless there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Id. For a discussion of the rule 12(b)(6) motion, see notes 20-23 and accompanying
text supra. See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, at § 1357.
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emphasized that "[i]t is a combination of the timing of the factual
jurisdictional attack, the plaintiffs having the burden of proof, and the
[trial] court's having a free hand in evaluating jurisdictional evidence [under
a 12(b)(1) motion] that can unfairly preclude Sherman Act plaintiffs from
reaching the merits of their cases."48 The Third Circuit thus concluded that
the district court's dismissal was premature in the instant case.49 By way of
summary, it stated that a trial court should demand less in the way of
jurisdictional proof for Sherman Act cases at the pretrial stage,50 and should
not dismiss a plaintiffs claim unless it is clear that the plaintiff "would not
be able to prove the necessary interstate [commerce] nexus." 51
After observing that the conflicting opinions of the other circuits only
further confirmed "the difficulties of separating out the jurisdictional nexus
from factual issues that go to the merits of the claim,"52 the Third Circuit
scrutinized Supreme Court decisions for guidance.53 Though it found no
decision directly on point, 54 the Third Circuit attempted to substantiate its
decision by relying on recent actions in which the Supreme Court: 1)
permitted jurisdiction under the Sherman Act to expand as the Congres-
sional commerce power expanded generally;55 2) counseled trial courts to
evaluate the "combination of factors" rather than each allegation separately
48. 549 F.2d at 892.
49. Id. at 897-98.
50. Id. at 892. This approach is similar to the one advocated by the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits where determination of the jurisdictional question is postponed until a
decision on the merits if the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits or if
they simply have not been fully developed. For a discussion of the approach of the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits, see notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.
51. 549 F.2d at 892. This test is the same as the one under a rule 12(b)(6) motion
where a claim may not be dismissed unless it is clear that the plaintiff could prove no
set of facts on which a claim for relief could be based. For a discussion of this test and
the rule 12(b)(6) motion, see note 21 and accompanying text supra. And for a
discussion by the Fourth Circuit of the similarity between rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
motions in evaluating jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, see notes 25-27 and
accompanying text supra.
52. 549 F.2d at 894.
53. Id. at 894-97.
54. Id. at 895. For a discussion of the recent Supreme Court decisions on this
issue, see notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
55. 549 F.2d at 897, citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95
(1974). The Third Circuit also discussed Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975), which was factually similar to the instant case
in that it, too, involved legal services relating to real estate transactions. 421 U.S. at
773; see 549 F.2d at 895-96. In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court had found that although
the legal services were performed wholly intrastate, they nonetheless affected
interstate commerce since they were an integral part of the home mortgages which
were in interstate commerce because a substantial number of them were granted by
out-of-state lenders and insured by out-of-state agencies. 421 U.S. at 783-85. The
Third Circuit distinguished Mortensen from Goldfarb, noting that in the instant case
the mortgages were wholly intrastate transactions since First Federal operated only
in New Jersey. 549 F.2d at 896-97; see note 1 supra. The court emphasized, however,
that the transactions might still be under the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act if they
were found to otherwise substantially affect interstate commerce. 549 F.2d at 896-97.
The Mortensen court also noted the expanding jurisdictional reach of the
Sherman Act as evidence that the Supreme Court looks with favor on the antitrust
plaintiff. Id. at 897. For a discussion of this trend, see note 12 supra.
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in determining whether interstate commerce is substantially affected by a
defendant's conduct;56 3) did not criticize an appellate court's treatment of a
dismissal of a Sherman Act case as though it were based on a rule 12(b)(6)
motion where it was unclear whether the district court had dismissed the
suit on the basis of a rule 12(b)(6) motion or a rule 12(b)((1) motion; 57 and 4)
admonished that in antitrust cases rule 12(b)(6) dismissals should not be
granted unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim5 8
and, furthermore, that "dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample
opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly." 59
The Third Circuit concluded its analysis by stating that there were two
major considerations that "militate against early 12(b)(1) dismissals of
Sherman Act claims: 1) the intertwined nature of the two sets of facts
necessary for jurisdiction and the merits; and 2) an apparent increase in the
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act, meaning that less substantial
effects would be necessary to support jurisdiction."' 0 The court then
examined the plaintiffs' allegations and found them sufficient to withstand
the pretrial jurisdictional challenge. 61
In analyzing the Third Circuit's lengthy discussion of the different
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in Sherman Act cases, it is
difficult to determine the precise holding in Mortensen. The court's emphasis
on the advantages of a rule 12(b)(6) motion as compared to a rule 12(b)(1)
motion initially appears to suggest that the Third Circuit is directing district
courts, when addressing jurisdictional issues in Sherman Act cases, to rely
on a rule 12(b)(6) motion or at least some of its procedural safeguards.6 2 A
56. 549 F.2d at 896, citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738, 744 (1976). The Third Circuit emphasized that it saw "no reason to consider only
a few allegations for the 'in commerce' test and the rest for the 'affecting' test, as the
trial court did, thereby depriving plaintiffs of several significant contacts in the
'affecting' test." 549 F.2d at 896.
57. 549 F.2d at 896, citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738 (1976). For a discussion of the Hospital Building case, see notes 26-28 and
accompanying text supra.
58. 549 F.2d at 896, citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738 (1976). For authority on this point, the Hospital Building Court relied on Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). For a discussion of Conley, see note 21 supra.
59. 549 F.2d at 896, citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738, 747 (1976). Here, the Hospital Building Court relied on Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962). For a discussion of Poller, see note 23
supra.
60. 549 F.2d at 897.
61. Id. Briefly, the factors found by the Third Circuit to support jurisdiction
included the following:
1) First Federal is federally chartered and subject to federal regulation; 2) those
regulations may prohibit the very activity complained of; 3) New York lenders
compete for the mortgages, the alleged tying product; 4) out-of-state title
companies may compete as a substitute for the title searches, the alleged tied
product; 5) a considerable part of First Federal's loan funds is lent to First
Federal from out-of-state; 6) many of the mortgages made by First Federal are
insured by out-of-state institutions; 7) the alleged tie-in may place an
unreasonable burden on the flow of home buyers, and related goods and services,
into New Jersey; and 8) perhaps one-fourth of the mortgages are initiated by
out-of-state mortgagors.
Id.
62. See id. at 891-92.
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closer reading of the opinion, however, indicates that the Third Circuit
specifically states only that the district court, when considering such
challenges to jurisdiction, must provide two additional procedural safe-
guards for antitrust plaintiffs: 1) the claim may not be dismissed on the
basis of a rule 12(b)(1) motion unless it is clear that the plaintiff would not
be able to prove the necessary interstate commerce nexus; and 2) less in the
way of jurisdictional proof should be required for Sherman Act cases at the
pretrial stage.63 In light of the Third Circuit's failure to articulate explicit
guidelines for the district courts to follow in applying these standards, it is
submitted that the court's opinion leaves Sherman Act plaintiffs hopeful,
but uncertain. The procedural safeguards against early dismissals for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction must be further clarified.
The lack-of any specific guidelines in ortensen for the district courts is
made even more apparent by a comparison with other circuit decisions on
this issue. The Fourth Circuit offers real advantages to the antitrust
plaintiff by definitely stating that the jurisdictional question in such cases
must usually be postponed until a decision on the merits or, at least,
dismissed at a pretrial stage only on the basis of a rule 12(b)(6) motion. 64 The
Fifth and Seventh Circuits also provide the antitrust plaintiff with
substantial procedural safeguards by emphasizing that the plaintiff must be
given ample time and opportunity to present his case before a court
considers a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.65 It is
submitted that, although the above procedures might be implicitly required
by the Third Circuit's broad language in Mortensen, the failure of the Third
Circuit to so specify leaves uncertain the effect of its decision.
Despite its failure to enunciate more specific guidelines for district
courts in evaluating jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, the Mortensen
decision would seem to be in harmony with the recent Supreme Court
decisions on related issues.66 In its attempt to give the Sherman Act plaintiff
additional procedural safeguards to assure him a chance to prove his claim,
it is submitted that the Third Circuit is reflecting the Supreme Court's
disapproval of premature dismissals of antitrust suits.6 7 It is further
submitted that the Third Circuit's decision in Mortensen is a logical
extension of Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,6 in which
the Supreme Court did not criticize the appellate court's treatment of a
dismissal as one under a rule 12(b)(6) motion where the basis of the district
63. Id. at 892.
64. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's approach, see notes 25-28 and
accompanying text supra.
65. For a discussion of the approaches of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, see notes
29, 30 & 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
66. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions in this area, see notes 38-40
and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of
these cases, see notes 53-59 and accompanying text supra.
67. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
For a discussion of Poller, see note 23 supra. For a discussion of the other Supreme
Court decisions in this area, see notes 38-40 & 53-59 and accompanying text supra.
68. 425 U.S. 738 (1976). For a discussion of Hospital Building, see notes 26-28 and
accompanying text supra.
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court's dismissal was unclear.6 9 The Third Circuit's counseling that some
rule 12(b)(6) procedures should be adapted for a dismissal clearly based on a
rule 12(b)(1) motion 70 further reflects an increasingly favorable judicial
attitude toward antitrust plaintiffs.
Despite the various approaches adopted by the circuits, it is apparent
that the courts of appeals are attempting to develop some standards to
relieve antitrust plaintiffs of the potential hardships they face when the
subject matter jurisdiction of their complaints is attacked under rule 12(b)(1)
motions. 71 This trend is in harmony with the policy reflected in recent
Supreme Court decisions.7 2 The success of these procedural safeguards,
however, depends on their application by the lower courts, which, in turn,
depends on the clarity and specificity of the appellate courts' guidelines. It is
submitted that the decision of the Third Circuit in Mortensen, although a
clear attempt to aid antitrust plaintiffs, lacks that specificity. Thus, its
effectiveness may be impaired until clarification by the Third Circuit is
forthcoming.
Missy Walrath
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - BANK ROBBERY - SPECIFIC INTENT IS NOT
ELEMENT OF THE FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY STATUTE.
United States v. Brown (1976)
Appellant Redding was convicted of violating sections 2113(a) (first
paragraph) and (d) of the Federal Bank Robbery Statute (Statute).' During
69. 425 U.S. at 742 n.1.
70. 549 F.2d at 892. See notes 50-51 & 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
71. For a discussion of the decisions of other circuits, see notes 25-37 and
accompanying text supra.
72. See notes 38-40 & 53-59 and accompanying text supra.
1. United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36, 37 (3d Cir. 1976). The opinion of the lower
court was unreported.
Sections 2113(a) (para. 1) and (d) provide:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation takes, or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other
things of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or
possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan; shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense
defined in (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the
life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (para. 1), (d) (1970).
Appellant Redding and two other men entered and took $8,330.00 from a
federally insured bank in Clairton, Pennsylvania. Brief for Appellant at 3, United
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his trial, Redding offered a defense of intoxication.2 The district court
refused to charge the jury that specific intent was an element of a violation
of sections 2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d).3 The court also refused to give
defendant's requested charge that his intoxication might negate specific
intent.4 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5
affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding, inter alia,6 that specific
intent is not an element of a section 2113(a) (first paragaph) or (d) offense.
United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1976).
The Federal Bank Robbery Statute7 provides penalties for various
offenses 8 against federally insured money institutions.9 The Statute was
preceded by the Bank Robbery Act of 1934 (Act),10 which was basically a
codification of common law robbery.11 Sections 2(a) and (b) of the Act 12 were
States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1976). Appellant had a revolver in his possession
at the time. Id. Appellant's two codefendants plead guilty and did not go to trial. Id.
2. Brief for Appellant at 4, United States v. Brown 547 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1976).
3. 547 F.2d at 38.
4. Brief for Appellant at 18, United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1976).
5. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Aldisert and Gibbons and District
Judge McGlynn (sitting by designation). Judge Gibbons wrote the opinion of the
court.
6. Appellant also appealed the district court's denial of his motion to sequester
witnesses, made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 615. 547 F.2d at 37.
Appellant's counsel made this motion prior to the opening statements of either
counsel. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that, in the absence of special
circumstances, the purpose of rule 615 would not be furthered by allowing
sequestration of witnesses before any testimony was offered. Id. at 38. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 615.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970).
8. Section 2113 of the Federal Bank Robbery Statute provides sanctions for: 1)
taking by force, and violence, or intimidation, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (para. 1) (1970); 2)
entering a federally insured institution with the intent to commit a felony, id. § 2113(a)
(para. 2); 3) taking property with the intent to steal or purloin, id. § 2113(b); 4)
knowingly receiving stolen property, id. § 2113(c); 5) assaulting or putting in jeopardy
the life of a person by a dangerous weapon, id. § 2113(d); or 6) killing a person, or
forcing a person to accompany the offender, while in the course of committing one of
the offenses defined in § 2113, or avoiding apprehension or confinement for one of
these offenses, id. § 2113(e).
9. The terms "bank," "credit union," and "saving and loan association"
contained in § 2113(a) (pars. 1) pertain to federally insured money institutions, or to
money institutions operating under the laws of the United States. See id. §§ 2113(f)(h).
10. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, ch. 304, §§ 1-3, 48 Stat. 783 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 2113 (1970)). /
11. The Act sanctioned against the felonious taking of money or property from a
bank by the use of force, violence, or by putting a person in fear. See note 12 infra.
Robbery at common law was defined as "the felonious taking and carrying away of
the personal property of another, from his person or his presence, by violence or by
putting him in fear." W. CLARK AND W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CRIMES 781 (6th ed. 1948). Accord, United States v. Lilly, 512 F.2d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir.
1975) (Real, J., dissenting); Alford v. United States, 113 F.2d 885, 887 (10th Cir. 1950).
Thus, the Act and common law robbery are virtually identical.
12. Section 2 of the Bank Robbery Act of 1934 provided that:
(a) Whoever, by force or violence, or by putting in fear, feloniously takes, or
feloniously attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property
or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody,
26
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virtually identical to sections 2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d) of the Federal
Bank Robbery Statute, 13 except for the omission of the word "feloniously"
from the Statute.14 Traditionally, "feloniously" has been recognized as
signifying the element of specific intent in robbery at common law. 15 Thus,
the courts had little difficulty in finding that specific intent was an element
of a violation of sections 2(a) and (b) of the Act. 16 Subsequent to a 1948
revision in which the word "feloniously" was deleted,' 7 a division has
formed between the circuits that require specific intent as an element of a
violation of sections 2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d)18 and those that do
not. 19
The first federal appellate court to address the specific intent issue was
the Fifth Circuit in Caples v. United States.20 Defendants/appellants in
Caples maintained that, due to intoxication, they could not possess the
requisite specific intent.2' On appeal, the Caples court affirmed the
conviction "[s]ince the jury must have understood that it had to make an
affirmative finding on the specific intent issue to convict. ' '22
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Howard,23 aligned itself with the
Fifth Circuit, and reversed a conviction under sections 2113(a) (first
control, management, or possession of, any bank shall be fined not more than$5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense
defined in subsection (a) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy
the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined
not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000 or imprisoned not less than five years
nor more than twenty-five years, or both.
48 Stat. 783 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970)).
13. For the text of these provisions, see note 1 supra.
14. Compare the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (para. 1), (d), supra note 1, with the
text of the Bank Robbery Act of 1934, supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 512 F.2d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1975). For a
discussion of the use of the word "feloniously" to signify specific intent at common
law, see, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162, 136 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1964); State v.
Webb, 27 N.C. App. 391, 219 S.E.2d 268, 269 (1975). In Lilly, the Ninth Circuit
sustained a felony murder conviction, stating that "it was robbery's specific intent
that served to supply the element of premeditation." 512 F.2d at 1261.
16. See Rawls v. United States, 162 F.2d 798 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 781
(1947); Byers v. United States, 175 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1945); Wells v. United States,
124 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1941).
27. The word "feloniously" was deleted when the Bank Robbery Act of 1934 was
amended in 1948. See Federal Bank Robbery Statute, Pub. L. No. 772, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970)).
18. The Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits require specific intent. See United
States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1974); Scruggs v. United States, 450 F.2d 359
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1071 (1972); Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d
264 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 567 (1972); Caples v. United
States, 391 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1968).
19. The First and Ninth Circuits do not require specific intent. See United States
v. Klare, 545 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977); United States v.
Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Porter, 431 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970); United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970),
20. 391 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. Id. at 1020.
22. Id. at 1023.
23. 506 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1974).
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paragraph) and (d) after finding that the trial court had inadequately
charged the jury that the government must prove the defendant's specific
intent beyond a reasonable doubt.24 The Howard court stated that the
elements of the offense require, inter alia, that "the taking was done with
wrongful intent, that. is, knowingly and wilfully. '25 The Eighth Circuit is in
agreement with the Second and Fifth Circuits. 26
The Second Circuit's requirement of specific intent conflicts with the
First Circuit's holding in United States v. DeLeo.27 In DeLeo, the defendant
contended that an indictment for a violation of sections 2113(a) (first
paragraph) and (d) was fatally defective, because it failed to allege specific
intent on the part of the defendant. 28 The First Circuit, affirming the
conviction, held that specific intent was not an essential element of the
offense.29 The DeLeo court analogized the first paragraph of section 2113(a)
to common law robbery,3° stating that the subjective intent of the bank
robber is immaterial, as "the crime is his resort to force and violence, or
intimidation, in the presence of another person to accomplish his pur-
poses." 31 The Ninth Circuit has reached the same conclusion. 32
24. Id. at 1134.
25. Id. at 1133.
26. See Scruggs v. United States, 450 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1071 (1972). Petitioners in Scruggs appealed from a conviction under § 2113(a)
(para. 1) and (d), claiminig as error that, inter alia, the trial court failed to charge the
jury that the putting of a life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon was an
essential element of § 2113(d). Id. at 363. The Eighth Circuit agreed with petitioners,
vacating the § 2113(d) conviction and remanding the § 2113(a) conviction for
sentencing. Id. at 364. The Eighth Circuit cited with approval the trial court's charge
that § 2113(a) (para. 1) requires that the taking is done willfully. Id. Accord, Bradley v.
United States, 447 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 567
(1972).
27. 422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970).
28. 422 F.2d at 490.
29. Id. at 491.
30. Id. at 490. The court in DeLeo stated that "[tihe offense described in the first
paragraph of section 2113(a) . . .[is] . . . 'analogous' to common law robbery or 'in
the nature of robbery. .. .' Id., quoting Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 324
(1957), and Rawls v. United States, 162 F.2d 798, 799 (10th Cir. 1947). For a discussion
of robbery at common law, see note 11 supra.
31. 422 F.2d at 491. DeLeo was closely followed by another decision dealing with
§ 2113(a) (para. 1) in which the First Circuit affirmed its holding in DeLeo. See United
States v. McNamara, 422 F.2d 499 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1056 (1970).
32. The Ninth Circuit has held that § 2113(a) (para. 1) and (d) do not require
specific intent. See United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 259 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Porter, 431 F.2d 7, 10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970).
In Hartfield, the defendant was convicted of attempted robbery under § 2113(a),
(d) after the district court refused to admit testimony relating to his alleged
intoxication. 513 F.2d at 255-56. The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding
that, although § 2113(a) (para. 1) does not require specific intent, the testimony should
have been allowed for an insanity defense. Id. at 259. Accord, United States v. Lemon,
550 F.2d 467, 470 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977). In Porter, the defendant was convicted of a
violation of § 2113(a) (para. 1). 431 F.2d at 9. He contended that § 2113(a) required
specific intent and his alleged insanity should have warranted a "diminished
capacity" charge to the jury, thus negating the requisite specific intent. Id. at 9-10.
The Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he first paragraph does not require, as does the
second, intent to commit ... any felony .... Id. at 10. Furthermore, the court stated
that "[wihere a person has the mental capacity for criminal responsibility, proof that
1977-19781
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The Third Circuit in Brown noted the division among the circuit courts
of appeals which have confronted the specific intent issue33 and aligned
itself with those circuits which do not require specific intent.34 The Brown
court relied heavily upon Judge Coffin's careful statutory analysis in
DeLeo,35 and quoted extensively from it.36 Judge Coffin had observed that
six specific crimes are enumerated in section 2113,31 with felonious intent
specifically incorporated into two of them - entry with intent to steal38 and
taking property with intent to steal or purloin.39 A third, knowingly
receiving stolen property, 40 requires knowledge that the property was stolen.
According to Judge Coffin, the three remaining offenses, 41 which do not
require specific intent, are "acts which, when performed, are so unambigu-
ously dangerous to others that the requisite mental element is necessarily
implicit in the description." 42 The DeLeo court concluded that this "careful
draftsmanship" evidenced a legislative intent not to require specific intent
as an element of sections 2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d).43 The Brown
court adopted this conclusion.44
he took property of another by force or violence, or by intimidation, necessarily
establishes the required criminal intent, whether or not characterized as 'specific'
intent." Id. (footnote omitted). Porter and Hartfield were subsequently reaffirmed by
the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Klare, 545 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 905 (1977). In Klare, the Ninth Circuit found that "it is reasonable to
conclude that Congress intended to punish persons who engage in such [violent or
intimidating] acts without requiring that the Government prove every element of
common law robbery." 545 F.2d at 94.
33. 547 F.2d at 38. See notes 18 & 19 supra. Other circuits have not passed directly
upon the question of the necessity of specific intent under the pertinent subsections of
§ 2113. However, several have indicated the manner in which they might resolve the
question. The Fourth Circuit has compared bank robbery and bank larceny and
concluded that a larceny is inherent in a robbery. It has long been recognized that
specific intent to steal is an element of larceny. See, e.g., United States v. Northway,
120 U.S. 327, 335 (1887). Thus, the Fourth Circuit may require a specific intent to steal
under § 2113(a) (para. 1). But see United States v. McGann, 219 F.2d 431 (4th Cir.),
aff'g, 150 F. Supp. 463 (D. Md. 1957).
The Sixth Circuit, in discussing § 2113(d), stated that:
where a defendant is shown (a) to have created an apparently dangerous
situation, (b) intended to intimidate his victim to a degree greater than the mere
use of language, (c) which does, in fact, place his victim in reasonable
expectations of death or serious bodily injury, the requirements of section 2113(d)
are satisfied.
United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (6th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). Although the court in Beasley was dealing with § 2113(d),
and found that an intent to intimidate is necessary, it may decide to follow this line of
reasoning to require specific intent to rob under § 2113(a) (para. 1).
The Tenth Circuit has cited with approval the requirements for a § 2113(d)
conviction given in Beasley. See United States v. Marx, 485 F.2d 1179, 1185 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1973).
34. 547 F.2d at 38.
35. Id. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
36. 547 F.2d at 39.
37. 422 F.2d at 490.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (para. 2) (1970).
39. Id. § 2113(b).
40. Id. § 2113(c).
41. Id. §2113(a) (para. 1), (d), (e). See note 8 supra.
42. 422 F.2d at 491.
43. Id.
44. 547 F.2d at 38.
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It is submitted that the Third Circuit's decision in Brown represents the
court's application of the position of the United States Supreme Court that
[w]hile the general rule at common law was that scienter was a
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime. . . there
has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under
statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a require-
ment. It is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court.4 5
By adopting the DeLeo position, the Third Circuit seemingly found that the
primary purpose of sections 2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d) was not merely
to protect federally insured money institutions from the taking of money, but
rather, to punish the individual who used force, violence, or intimidation to
accomplish the taking.4 6 The absence of any mention of felonious intent or
robbery in sections 2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d) supports the court's
finding. Congress deleted any reference to intent or common law robbery,4 7
thereby expressing its intention to punish the wrongful use of force,
violence, or intimidation without regard to specific intent.48 It is submitted
that the purpose of the Statute - to penalize the use of force, violence, or
intimidation - would be frustrated if a court, faced with an intoxication
defense, were to read the Statute as requiring specific intent.49
The Brown decision apparently reflects the Third Circuit's recognition
that society's interests could best be protected by distinguishing between
"the elements of an offense, where the statute simply denounces the doing of
an act as criminal, and where it denounces as criminal only the willful
doing."' '5 Society tends to view acts of violence as more harmful than the
45. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922). In Balint, the defendant
demurred to the indictment alleging the illegal sale of narcotics, on the ground that
the indictment failed to allege knowledge on the part of the defendant. Id. at 251. The
Supreme Court overruled the demurrer. Id. at 254.
46. 547 F.2d at 39.
47. See note 17 supra.
48. The Supreme Court has stated that:
[w]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to thejudicial mind unless otherwise instructed.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). It is submitted that Congress
deleted the term "feloniously" from the Statute since, if included, Congress would
have "know[n] and adopt[ed] the cluster of ideas that were attached to [it]."
For a discussion of other statutes and their common law elements, see United
States v. Lilly, 512 F.2d 1259, 1262-64 (9th Cir. 1975) (Real, J., dissenting) (an
examination of legislative intent regarding the necessity of specific intent under 18
U.S.C. § 2111 (1970)); 12 VAND. L. REV. 495 (1959) (a comparison of elements of
robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970) with the elements of common
law robbery).
49. A defendant's state of mind at the time of the commission of an offense -
whether the defendant had the requisite specific intent - is often a difficult element
to prove. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 203 (1972).
For a discussion of the method of proof of a defendant's mental state, see note 55
infra.
50. United States v. Parisi, 365 F.2d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 1966), quoting Hargrove v.
United States, 67 F.2d 820, 823 (5th Cir. 1933). The Parisi court further stated: "In the
1977-1978]
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taking of money.5 1 It is submitted that the Brown court's refusal to recognize
specific intent as a requirement of a violation of sections 2113(a) (first
paragraph) and (d) accommodates this value judgment by affording
protection from violent acts without respect to specific intent.52
In Brown, the Third Circuit eased the government's burden of proof
under section 2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d) indictments. The government
need not allege and offer proof of a defendant's specific intent; it must
merely prove a taking from a federally insured money institution by force,
violence, or intimidation.5 3 A defendant will no longer escape conviction by
raising a defense of intoxication, since the general intent required in Brown
is not negated by intoxication.54 The result may be more convictions under
section 2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d) at a reduced cost to the govern-
ment.
55
first class of cases, .. the law imputes the intent .... In the second class of cases, a
specific wrongful intent, that is, actual knowledge of the existence of the obligation
and a wrongful intent to evade it, is of the essence." 365 F.2d at 606 (citations
omitted). Parisi involved a conviction under § 549 of the Customs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 549
(1970), for unlawfully removing certain merchandise from the bonded area of a
customs warehouse. The circuit court affirmed the conviction, stating that the offense
fell into the first class identified by the court and thus did not require a specific intent.
365 F.2d at 606.
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960). The
pertinent section of the Comment states:
The violent petty thief operating in the streets and alleys of our big cities, the
'mugger,' is one of the main sources of insecurity and concern of the population.
There is a special element of terror in this kind of depredation. The ordinary
citizen feels himself able to guard against surreptitious larceny, embezzlement or
fraud, to some extent, by his own wits or caution. But he abhors robbers who
menace him or his wife with violence against which he is helpless ....
Id.
52. As one commentator has observed:
We [society] are thinking today more of the protection of social and public
interest; and ... modern criminologists are teaching that the objective
underlying correctional treatment should change from the barren area of
punishing human beings to the fruitful one of protecting social interests. As a
direct result of this new emphasis upon public and social, as contrasted with
individual, interests, courts have naturally tended to concentrate more upon the
injurious conduct of the defendant than upon the problem of his individual guilt.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 68 (1933).
53. The Ninth Circuit, in dealing with an intoxication defense under a § 2113(a)
(para. 1) indictment, stated that "proof that an accused had a general intent to
commit the acts proscribed by the statute is sufficient to sustain conviction under the
first paragraph of section 2113(a)." United States v. Klare, 545 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977).
54. See Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 633 (1881). For a discussion of the effect of
intoxication on general intent, see generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAw 566 (2d. 1960); Beck and Parker, The Intoxicated Offender - A
Problem of Responsibility, 44 CAN. B. REv. 563 (1966).
Although a defense of intoxication will not be available to negate specific
intent, intoxication when so extreme as to amount to insanity may still be allowed as
a valid defense. See United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975). For a
discussion of Hartfield, see note 32 supra.
55. Rarely is a defendant's mental state provable through direct testimony or
evidence. The traditional method of proof is the piecing together of various items of
testimony, which increases court time and prosecution expense. See W. LAFAvE & A.
SCOTW, JR., supra note 49, at 203. It is submitted that by eliminating the need for
proving specific intent court time and governmental expense will be reduced.
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The Third Circuit has stripped the crime of robbery of a federally
insured money institution of its common law elements and placed it strictly
within the purview of the Statute. The result is that, in the Third Circuit,
proof of specific intent is not needed to secure a conviction under sections
2113(a) (first paragraph) and (d) and the defense of intoxication will not be
available to defendants in such a case. 56 '
William D. Goldberg
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - WEAPONS POSSESSION - UNLESS OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL, A PRIOR CONVICTION MAY BE
USED AS A PREDICATE FOR A SUBSEQUENT FIREARMS VIOLATION,
REGARDLESS OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY.
United States v. Graves (1977)
Defendant Graves was indicted, in 1972, on two counts of violating
provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (Act),' which restrict the right of
convicted felons and other persons considered to have dangerous propensi-
ties to bear arms.2 The first count alleged contravention of sections 922(a)(6)3
and 924(a)4 of Title IV of the Act resulting from Graves' false certification on
56. See note 54 supra.
1. United States v. Graves, 394 F. Supp. 429, 430 (W.D. Pa. 1975), affl'd, 554 F.2d
65 (3d Cir. 1977); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-923 (1970); id., App. §§ 1201-1203.
2. 394 F. Supp. 429, 430 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
3. Section 922(a)(6) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful -
(6) for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition
of any firearm or ammunition from a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
licensed dealer, or licensed collector, knowingly to make any false or fictitious
oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any false, fictitious, or
misrepresented identification, intended or likely to deceive such importer,
manufacturer, dealer, or collector with respect to any fact material to the
lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm or ammunition under
the provisions of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1970).
4. Section 924 reads in part:
Whoever violates any provision of this chapter or knowingly makes any
false statement or representation with respect to the information required by the
provisions of this chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this
chapter, or in applying for any license or exemption or relief from disability
under the provisions of this chapter, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and shall become eligible for parole
as the Board of Parole shall determine.
Id. § 924(a).
1977-19781
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a registration form, used in purchasing a firearm, that he had not previously
been convicted of a crime punishable by one year's imprisonment.5 The
second count charged abridgement of section 1202(a)(1) of Title VII of the
Acts based on the allegation that, after having been convicted of a felony,
the defendant received and possessed a firearm that had moved in interstate
commerce.
7
Alleging that the conviction underlying the firearms indictment had not
been constitutionally obtained because he was denied certain procedural
safeguards mandated by due process, Graves moved before trials to dismiss
the indictment. 9 The district court refused to dismiss the indictment, 10 and
found Graves guilty on both counts of violating the Act." On appeal, the
5. 394 F. Supp. at 430.
6. Section 1202 provides in part:
(a) Any person who -
(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any
political subdivision thereof of a felony, . . . and who receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of
this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1970).
7. 394 F. Supp. at 430. The defendant had previously been convicted of larceny of
an automobile, punishable by at least one year in prison. Id. at 432.
8. Id. at 430. Prior to the indictment in the instant case, Graves had not
attempted to overturn his larceny conviction by direct appeal or collateral attack; nor
did he direct himself to the relief available under § 925 of the Act. 554 F.2d at 67.
Section 925 provides in part:
A person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year ... may make application to the Secretary for relief
from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition,
receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms and incurred by reason of
such conviction, and the Secretary may grant such relief ....
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1970).
9. 394 F. Supp. at 430-31. Graves contended that, since he was seventeen years
old at the time of arrest on the outstanding larceny conviction, the action could have
been handled by juvenile authorities. Instead, it was transferred to adult criminal
court where the conviction was obtained. Id. at 432. Graves argued that at the hearing
prior to the transfer to adult criminal courts, he was denied certain procedural
safeguards required by due process as enumerated by the Supreme Court. Id. at 431.
In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Supreme Court asserted that
as a condition to a valid waiver order [of juvenile court jurisdiction], petitioner
was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records
and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court,
and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision.
Id. at 556. The Third Circuit adopted these safeguards as constitutionally mandated.
See Turner v. Rundle, 438 F.2d 839, 842 (3d Cir. 1971).
Regarding his prior conviction, Graves maintained that that court prejudged
his case, failed to make a detailed and reviewable consideration of the facts, and
failed to supply a statement of reasons for its decision. 394 F. Supp. at 432.
Contending that these defects rendered the conviction unconstitutional, Graves
asserted that it could not be introduced into the present prosecution. Id.
10. 394 F. Supp. at 430. At trial for the Gun Control Act violations, Graves moved
for acquittal using the arguments raised in the pretrial motion to quash the
indictment. Id. See note 9 supra. The Government argued that any constitutional
defects in a conviction not yet expunged, could not be a defense to a firearms charge,
and that no proof of the validity of the underlying conviction was required. 554 F.2d
at 68.
11. 394 F. Supp. at 434.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,12 sitting en banc,
affirmed, holding that use of an outstanding conviction, even one claimed to
be constitutionally defective, is a permissible basis for a firearms violation,
where that constitutional challenge is on grounds other than the denial of
the sixth amendment right to counsel. United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65
(3d Cir. 1977).
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court in Burgett v. Texas, 13 held
that any conviction obtained without the benefit of counsel in violation of
Gideon v. Wainwright,4 may not be used to enhance punishment or support
guilt for another offense.' 5 The scope of the rule enunciated in Burgett has
been extended to previous convictions obtained in violation of constitutional
rights other than the denial of counsel.' 6 In United States v. Martinez,17 the
Seventh Circuit intimated that the rationale of Burgett encompassed any
action where there existed a previous denial of any fundamental constitu-
tional right.18 The Fifth Circuit, in Beto v. Stacks,19 interpreted the Burgett
rule as extending to an underlying conviction obtained in violation of any
12. Judge Adams wrote the majority opinion. Judge Garth concurred in part and
dissented in part, joined by Chief Judge Seitz, and Judge Gibbons dissented, joined by
Judge Aldisert.
13. 389 U.S. 109 (1967). Burgett involved an attempt to enhance punishment
under a Texas recidivist statute through the use of a prior conviction obtained without
defense counsel. Id. at 111. The first count of a five-count indictment against the
defendant alleged that he had-cut and stabbed his victim with the intent to kill; the
remaining four counts alleged that the defendant had incurred four previous felony
convictions. Id. The state offered into evidence a copy of one of the convictions,
obtained in Tennessee, which indicated that the defendant had not been represented
by counsel. Id. at 112. The defendant's objection that the absence of counsel violated
the fourteenth amendment was sustained but the court admitted into evidence
another version of the conviction which did not show on its face the absence of
counsel. Id. at 112-13. In the instructions to the jury the state court subsequently
withdrew any consideration of the prior offenses. Id. at 113. The Supreme Court found
the admission of the prior conviction inherently prejudicial notwithstanding the
instructions to disregard it. Id. at 115.
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the indigent defendant was charged by the
State of Florida with a noncapital offense. His request for appointed counsel was
denied on the grounds that Florida state law permitted the appointment of counsel in
capital cases only. Id. at 336-37. The Supreme Court declared that the right of an
indigent defendant to the assistance of counsel in a criminal trial is a fundamental
right essential to a fair trial, and conviction without such assistance is in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 342-45.
15. 389 U.S. at 115.
16. See notes 17-27 and accompanying text infra.
17. 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969).
18. Id. at 63. The Martinez court addressed the issue of whether a federal district
court had the power to conduct a hearing regarding the constitutional validity of a
prior conviction used to enhance punishment for a subsequent offense. Id. at 61-62.
The defendant contended that his previous conviction was tainted by a denial of fifth
amendment due process requirements and effective assistance of counsel under the
sixth amendment. Id. at 63. The Martinez court specifically rejected the government's
distinction between a prior conviction invalid on its face and one with latent
invalidity as a qualification on the district court's power to strike the prior proceeding
from the present record. Id. The court held that the district court had the power to
conduct a hearing to ascertain the constitutional validity of a prior conviction which
the government attempted to introduce for the purpose of enhancing punishment. Id.
at 64.
19. 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969).
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specific federal right made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment. 20 Conceding that the fourth amendment violation in question
in Stacks21 was less likely to affect the integrity of the fact-finding process
than the absence of counsel, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless held that fourth
amendment violations are to be treated as equivalent to sixth amendment
violations within the context of Burgett,22 asserting that "the creation of...
a constitutional hierarchy is not part of the rationale of Burgett.'' 23
In United States v. Penta,24 the First Circuit disagreed with the
reasoning in Stacks.25 The Penta court allowed evidence of prior convictions
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment to be used for general
impeachment purposes 26 and distinguished between fourth and sixth
amendment violations with respect to an unconstitutional conviction.27
The Burgett doctrine has raised questions concerning the proper
interpretation of the Gun Control Act of 1968. The general intent of the Act
was to limit access to firearms to responsible persons;28 however, Congress
failed to indicate whether prior felony convictions, which remove the felon
20. Id. at 316. In Stacks, the defendant was convicted of robbery by assault. Id. at
314. At trial a prior conviction was introduced for purposes of enhancement of
punishment, which was obtained with the use of evidence resulting from an unlawful
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 314-15. In affirming
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus the circuit court reasoned that since the
Constitution requires the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure to be excluded at
trial, there is no reason to allow a conviction based on such evidence to prejudice the
defendant at a subsequent trial. Id. at 317. To do so, the court felt, would cause the
accused to suffer anew the denial of his constitutional rights. Id.
21. See note 20 supra.
22. 408 F.2d at 316.
23. Id.
24. 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 96. See note 27 infra.
26. 475 F.2d at 96. The defendant was convicted of fraudulently possessing and
transferring counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes. At this trial prior state convictions
were used to impeach the defendant's credibility. Id. at 92-93. Subsequently, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed defendant's earlier state convictions
for concealing stolen motor vehicles on the basis of introduction of evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 92. On appeal from the denial of new
federal trial, the First Circuit found the use of the prior convictions harmless error. Id.
at 93, 96.
27. Id. at 92-93. The Penta court agreed that evidence obtained by unlawful
search and seizure has a definite influence on the fact-finding process. However, the
court observed that such evidence made a resulting conviction more reliable, whereas
a sixth amendment violation tended to make a conviction less reliable. Id.
28. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 76, 80 (1968). After listing statistics on
crimes involving the use of firearms the report stated:
Civic, religious, and fraternal affiliations have urged the enactment of
meaningful and effective Federal legislation to regulate the interstate traffic in,
and access to, firearms.
Passage of this legislation would not interfere with the lawful use of firearms
by the vast majority of responsible gun owners in the United States.
Id. at 76. Concerning Title VII of the Act, Senator Long of Louisiana, a principal
sponsor, stated:
What the amendment seeks to do is to make it unlawful for a firearm - be it
a handgun, a machinegun, a long-range rifle, or any kind of firearm - to be in
the possession of a convicted felon who has not been pardoned and who has
therefore lost his right to possess firearms.
114 CONG. REc. 14773 (1968).
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from the class of "responsible persons," must be constitutionally obtained. 29
The problem arises in the context of both section 922(a)(6) of Title IV of the
Act which requires disclosure of previous convictions 3° and section 1202(a)(1)
of Title VII of the Act which provides that convicted felons may not possess
firearms.
31
With respect to violations of the disclosure provisions of section
922(a)(6), there is a general consensus that the Act compels disclosure of all
convictions that have not been set aside at the time of disclosure,
notwithstanding their constitutional validity.32 In actions involving
violations of section 1202(a)(1) predicated on prior convictions obtained in
the absence of counsel, Burgett has controlled. 33 There is some disagree-
29. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a) (1970) and 18 U.S.C. app. 1202(a)(1) (1970).
For the text of these sections, see notes 3-4 & 6 supra.
30. See note 3 supra.
31. See note 6 supra. The issue is complicated to some extent by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). In considering whether
the phrase "in commerce or affecting commerce" in § 1202(a) applies to "possesses"
and "receives" as well as to "transports," the Court held that sections 922 and 1202
were not required to be interpreted in the same manner. Id. at 344.
32. See, e.g., United- States v. Ransom, 545 F.2d 481, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1977);
Cassity v. United States, 521 F.2d 1320, 1322 (6th Cir., 1975); United States v.
Williams, 484 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1973). The District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania has held that the "government is entitled to rely upon the existing
situation, rather than being required to negate a nonexistent potential modification
thereof." United States v. McDowell, 328 F. Supp. 606, 609 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
The Eighth Circuit has retreated somewhat from the generally held view of
§ 922(a)(6) violations. See United States v. Cody, 529 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1976). In Cody,
the defendant contended that the state judge had made a technical error in his trial by
imposing sentence for a felony conviction before the defendant had filed a motion for
a new trial. Id. at 566. The defendant thus argued that the judgment in this prior
conviction was void and could not serve as a predicate for the firearms conviction. Id.
Although rejecting this contention and upholding a conviction for false certification
of prior criminal record in connection with the purchase of a firearm, the court
indicated that a constitutional infirmity based on lack of counsel in the prior
conviction would have required a reversal. Id. at 567 n.4. One court has held that an
invalid state conviction cannot be used as part of the federal govenment's case. See
United States v. Megura, 394 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Conn. 1975).
The United States Supreme Court offered guidance concerning section
922(a)(6) violations in Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1974). While the
dominant issue before the Court was whether § 922(a)(6) covered redemption of a
firearm from a pawnshop, the Court described § 922(a)(6) as being
enacted as a means of providing adequate and truthful informution about
firearms transactions. Information drawn from records kept by dealers was a
prime guarantee of the [Gun Control] Act's effectiveness .... Thus, any false
statement with respect to the eligibility of a person to obtain a firearm from a
licensed dealer was made subject to a criminal penalty.
Id. at 825 (citations omitted).
33. See United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1970). The defendant in Lufman argued that the
government could not assert as proof of his status as a convicted felon a 1938
conviction obtained without assistance of defense counsel. 457 F.2d at 166. Relying on
Burgett, the court held that the conviction was constitutionally void at its inception
and that the defendant was not a convicted felon at the time he obtained possession of
a firearm. Id. at 167-68. In DuShane, the issue was whether the defendant had waived
his right to counsel in a conviction on which his firearms indictment was predicated.
435 F.2d at 188. The court stated, "If the appellant did not waive his right to counsel
in 1959, Burgett would require us to set aside his conviction." Id. at 190.
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ment, however, with respect to the use of a prior conviction as a basis for a
section 1202(a)(1) offense where the prior conviction has been questioned on
other than sixth amendment grounds.34
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Liles,35 held that "Congress did
not intend to exempt from section 1 2 02 (a)(1) one whose status as a convicted
felon changed after the date of possession, regardless of how that change of
status occurred." 36 In McHenry v. California,3 7 the Ninth Circuit later
withdrew from this per se position and distinguished Liles from the case sub
judice on the ground that while the underlying conviction in Liles was
invalid for reasons of insufficient evidence, McHenry's earlier conviction
was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.38
The Fifth Circuit in Dameron v. United States3 9 intimated that the
Burgett rule should be interpreted broadly in the context of the Gun Control
Act, asserting that the provision of the Act concerning transportation of a
firearm in interstate commerce40 should have expressly indicated its
application to unconstitutional convictions if it were intended to so apply.41
The First Circuit has advanced a different position, interpreting section
1202(a)(1) by comparing the relative disability to the defendant against the
benefit to the public. 42
Against this background of diverse analytical approaches and results,
the Third Circuit in Graves examined the Act, its legislative history, and
prior case law to determine the congressional intent in drafting the Act. 43
According to the court, section 922 was designed to punish any material
34. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text infra.
35. 432 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1970). Liles, a convicted felon, was arrested for unlawful
possession of a firearm in February, 1969 and convicted of this violation in February,
1970, one day after his underlying conviction was reversed on appeal. Id. at 19.
36. Id. at 20-21.
37. 447 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1971).
38. Id. at 470-71. The McHenry court reviewed the defendant's conviction for
violating a California statute prohibiting possession of a concealed weapon by a
convicted felon, where, after such possession, the prior felony conviction was reversed
because it had been unconstitutionally obtained. Id. at 470. See also Pasterchik v.
United States, 466 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1971).
39. 488 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1974). The court was referring to § 922(gXl) of the Act
which states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who is under indictment for,
or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year to ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate
or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1970).
40. 488 F.2d at 727. The Dameron court thus interpreted § 922(g)(1) as requiring
constitutional convictions. Id. Since Dameron's prior conviction was ruled void under
the principles of Gideon, the court reversed the § 22(g)(1) conviction. Id. at 724.
41. See United States v. Samson, 533 F.2d 721, 722-23 (lst Cir. 1976). The Samson
court was confronted with the question of whether § 1202(a)(1) required a final
conviction. Id. at 722. The defendant had been convicted of a felony in a state court
but at the time of this decision, that conviction was on appeal. Id. The balancing test
was used to decide whether to use a restricted or broad interpretation of "being
convicted by a court." Id. Applying this method of interpretation, the Samson court
held that because the public benefit was greater than the felon's loss of the privilege
to possess a firearm the prior conviction need not be constitutionally valid. Id.
42. 554 F.2d at 68-78. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
43. 554 F.2d at 70.
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misrepresentation in a weapons transaction.44 Thus, the Graves court
determined that this section was concerned with the need for complete
disclosure rather than the constitutionality of the prior felony conviction4 5
and affirmed Graves' conviction for the section 922(a)(6) violation despite
the constitutional questions raised concerning the prior conviction.46
The court noted that section 1202 prohibited the possession of firearms
by certain classes of persons whom Congress thought likely to misuse the
weapons; these included convicted felons. 47 The court reasoned that the Act
called for the fact of conviction, and did not require the conviction to be
obtained in any particular manner. 48 The Graves court asserted that
Congress intended to have the firearms disability remain unless relief from
the conviction was obtained through the relief provision in the Act.49
The defendant in Graves unsuccessfully contended that Dameron°
supported the interpretation that the Act required a constitutionally valid
prior conviction.51 The Third Circuit distinguished Dameron because the
underlying felony conviction there had been ruled unconstitutional by the
state court before the federal charge had reached trial,52 whereas the
defendant in Graves had first attacked his prior conviction in a motion to
dismiss his indictment for violation of the Act.53
44. Id. at 71-72. To support this determination, the Graves court alluded to
another provision of § 922 which prohibits receipt of firearms transported in interstate
and foreign commerce by persons merely indicted, i.e., those who have yet to be
convicted validly or invalidly. Id. See 18 U.S.C. §922(h)(1) (1970). Because those
merely indicted, and thus still entitled to a presumption of innocence, were included in
the regulatory scheme of § 922, the court reasoned the congressional intent required
that the defendant answer questions truthfully, whether the defendant believed those
convictions to be constitutionally valid or not. 554 F.2d at 71-72.
45. Id. at 83.
46. Id. at 69. Other potential firearms abusers included dishonorable discharge, of
the armed forces, illegal aliens, mental incompetents and those who had renounced
citizenship. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 73. For text pertinent to relief from disabilities under the Act, see note 8
supra. The court viewed §§ 1201-1203 as general prohibitions, indication that
Congress intended to restrict those with even the slightest potential for disrupting
public safety. 554 F.2d at 70.
49. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
50. 554 F.2d at 76-77. With respect to United States v. Cody, 529 F.2d 564 (8th Cir.
1976) see note 32 supra, the defendant took a similar stand. 554 F.2d at 76-77. The
Graves court, however, ruled that Cody did not deal with a constitutional question,
and thus the Cody court's interpretation of the Act's intent had no real effect on the
Graves' court holding. Id. The defendant in Graves contended that the Cody court's
admission that the broad interpretation of "convicted" does not extend to prior
convictions invalid for violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel was
applicable here. Id. at 76.
51. 554 F.2d at 76.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 77-78. The Dameron and Cody courts had, in the opinion of the Third
Circuit, concentrated too quickly on the constitutional impediments to the statutory
arrangement of the Act. Id. at 77. The Liles court, on the other hand, had gone
through the same process as the Graves court, examining legislative intent through
evaluation of the statutory language and legislative history. Id. at 78.
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Addressing the violation of section 1202, the Third Circuit asserted that
the Ninth Circuit's analytical approach of examining legislative intent
through evaluation of the statutory language and legislative history was
appropriate in Liles5 4 and further agreed with the Liles court that Congress
did not intend to exempt from section 1202 one whose status as a convicted
felon changed after the date of possession.55 The Graves court declined to
extend Burgett, distinguishing it on the three grounds.5 6 First, unlike
Burgett, there was no obvious constitutional defect evident on the face of the
record in the instant case.5 7 Second, while the defendant in Burgett had no
means of attacking his prior conviction, Graves had methods available.5 8
Third, Burgett was based on a violation of the right to counsel.5 9
Judge Garth concurred in the result of the majority on the section
922(a)(6) false information charge but aligned with the dissent on the section
1202 possession charge,6° maintaining that the conviction underlying such a
charge must be constitutionally obtained.61 He rejected the majority's
54. Id. at 78.
55. Id. at 80. The court immediately disposed of the question of the applicability
of Burgett to § 922(a)(6) violations determining that this section was concerned only
with the giving of fictitious information material to a firearms purchase. Id. at 79. See
notes 32 & 44 and accompanying text supra.
56. 554 F.2d at 80. In Burgett there was no dispute over whether defendant lacked
counsel in his previous conviction. 389 U.S. at 114. In contrast, the evidence was not
clear that Graves had been denied any constitutional right in his earlier trial. 554
F.2d at 80-81. The court admitted that no statutory disability would have arisen had
Graves' earlier conviction been overturned prior to his alleged § 1202 violation, but
noted that this was Graves' first attack on that prior conviction. Id. at 81.
57. 554 F.2d at 80. Under § 925(c), Graves could have petitioned the Secretary of
the Treasury to relieve him of the disability. Id. at 81. See note 8 8upra. The defendant
could also have requested a pardon specifically restoring his privilege to possess a
firearm. Id. Section 1203(2) provides:
This title shall not apply to -
(2) any person who has been pardoned by the President of the United States or
the chief executive of a State and has expressly been authorized by the President
or such chief executive, as the case may be, to receive, possess, or transport in
commerce a firearm.
18 U.S.C. app. § 1203(2) (1970). Graves could also have sought habeas corpus relief if
he believed the conviction was constitutionally defective. 554 F.2d at 81.
58. 554 F.2d at 80. The court asserted that Burgett was inextricably linked to
Gideon and showed reluctance to extend the holding of Burgett to the infirmity raised
by Graves.ld. at 82. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra. Graves contended
that his prior conviction would not pass constitutional muster based on the Supreme
Court holding in Kent. 554 F.2d at 67-68. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
59. 554 F.2d 65, 83-88 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 88.
61. Id. at 87-88 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Garth
saw an even closer relationship between the prior conviction and the present charge
than was present in Burgett, arguing that the defendant in Burgett could have been
tried for another offense. He noted that the defendant in Burgett, was tried under a
Texas recidivist statute and thus could be convicted of the offense although not
subject to enhanced punishment under the recidivist statute. Id. at 87. The
government, in Graves would have had no basis on which to apply the present charge
in the absence of the felony conviction. Id.
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attempt to distinguish Burgett,6 2 refusing to recognize, for purposes of
applying the Burgett rule, any distinction between fourth, fifth, sixth and
fourteenth amendment violations.6 3
Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing for a reversal of both counts of the
Gun Control Act convictions. 4 He viewed the majority opinion as allowing
one's status as a convicted felon to be sufficient to justify the application of
the Act regardless of the constitutionality of the prior felony conviction.6 5
It is submitted that the majority's position that section 922(a)(6), which
mandates disclosure of all material information by the purchaser of a
firearm,66 compels disclosure of all felony convictions regardless of their
constitutional validity is consistent with the intent of Congress in drafting
the section.67 Congress was apparently concerned not with the status of a
felon as it affected his future rights, but with the requirement that a
firearms purchaser give essential information truthfully.
The Graves court's view of section 1202, while supportable, 6 is
nevertheless susceptible to criticism. Sections 922(a)(6) and 1202 are
designed to prohibit different conduct and need not be interpreted in the
same manner.6 9 Section 1202 concerns the status of the individual firearm
possessor, whereas section 922(a)(6) imposes on all owners of firearms the
affirmative duty to provide information. 70 It is submitted that the majority,
in using section 922(a)(6) to facilitate its interpretation of section 1202, 71
obfuscated the different interests involved in these sections.
62. Id. at 87-88 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Accordingly, Judge Garth concluded that since he did not distinguish between
different unconstitutional convictions, Burgett did apply to the constitutional rights
set forth in Kent (see note 9 supra). Id. at 88.
63. 554 F.2d at 88-93 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 91 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed the majority opinion as
standing for the proposition that no constitutional violation would be appropriate
subject for collateral attack in a firearms violation prosecution. Id. The dissent was
also critical of the majority's fear of establishing a new avenue for collateral attack.
Id. at 90. Conceding that there is room for concern about the extent to which the
government strains the resources of the court in trying offenses without sufficient
manpower, the dissent argued that the courts cannot maintain their integrity if,
because appropriate collateral inquiry would take time, they give future effect to a
conviction that was unconstitutionally obtained by not reviewing that prior
conviction. Id.
65. See note 3 supra.
66. The decisions in other jurisdictions support this interpretation. See note 32
and accompanying text supra.
67. See 554 F.2d 65, 85 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. See notes 53-58 and accompanying text supra.
69. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. at 344. The Court in Bass stated, in
discussing §§ 922 and 1202, that the ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of leniency, requiring fair warning to be given the
public in the language of the statute and preferring the legislature, not the courts, to
define criminal activity. Id. at 347. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
70. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) with 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1). For the text of these
sections see notes 3 & 6 supra.
71. See 554 F.2d at 71-73. The Graves court stated, in its review of the statutory
construction of §§ 922(a)(6) and 1202(a)(1), that features of Title IV would also lend
support for its analysis of Title VII. Id. at 71. See text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
The court also noted that while the Supreme Court's view in Bass may preclude any
1977-1978]
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/10
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
It is further submitted that the majority's view of the scope of the
Burgett rule is unduly restrictive.72 The majority limited the application of
Burgett to convictions obtained without counsel, emphasizing the need to
prevent erosion of the principle of Gideon.73 But in so holding, the court may
not have given proper attention to the more general principle of Burgett that
an individual should not suffer anew from the original deprivation of his
rights.74 The Third Circuit's treatment of Burgett seems to place a premium
on the reliability of the conviction 75 rather than on protection of individual
rights. Appropriate consideration of an individual's rights would demand
that, for purposes of preventing future deprivation of rights, no distinction
exists among fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment violations
leading to convictions used to support guilt or enhance punishment.7 6
In Graves, the Third Circuit aligned itself with the circuits that have
examined the disclosure provisions of section 922(a)(6),77 and have
interpreted the section as compelling disclosure regardless of the constitu-
tional validity of the prior conviction. 78 The Graves decision will reinforce
this interpretation.
With respect to section 1202, Graves should lead to greater prosecutorial
efficiency.7 9 It is submitted that the Third Circuit's interpretation of this
section revitalizes the vitiated Liles approach,8° which disregards the
constitutionality of the prior conviction. 81
In conclusion, the court in Graves implicitly recognized a hierarchy of
constitutional rights, which gave greatest deference to the right to
counsel.8 2 The Third Circuit has thus added its viewpoint to the split in the
circuits over the question of the quality of a prior conviction necessary to
permit its use as a predicate for a firearms charge.83
Keith D. Heinold
invocation of Title IV as an interpretive aid for Title VII, it did not feel compelled to
read that language so broadly. Id. at 71 n.17.
72. See 554 F.2d 65, 87-88 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id. at 82. See notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
74. In Burgett the Court stated:
To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used
against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another
offense is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the
prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers
anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.
389 U.S. at 115.
75. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. The majority used Penta as support
for their refusal to expand Burgett. 554 F.2d at 82.
76. Judge Garth shares this view. See 554 F.2d at 87-88 (Garth, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
77. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
79. Firearms offenses will be prosecuted with greater certainty because collateral
attacks on underlying convictions must be pursued before the firearms trial. See 554
F.2d at 83.
80. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
82. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
83. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
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